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ABSTRACT
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS INEQUALITY
IN SOUTH KOREA
SEPTEMBER 2014
HYEON-KYEONG KIM, B.S., KOREA UNIVERSITY
M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott
My dissertation explores the effect of growth of temporary employment on earn-
ings inequality. Temporary workers make up a sizeable part of the labor force in
many countries. European debates have focused mainly on the employment effects
of temporary contracts. In Korea, by contrast, worsening wage distribution has
been the main issue: the composition of the labor force has seen significant change
and inequality has increased dramatically, but official unemployment rates have
remained consistently low.
In the first essay, I find that during a time when there was a nearly 10 percentage
points increase in the share of temporary workers in the Korean labor market (but
prior to the global recession), the rise in temporary employment can account for
a substantial part (20-30 percent) of the growth in overall wage inequality. These
v
results appear to be robust to alternative ways of performing the decomposition,
including using the recently developed recentered influence function approach of
Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux. In addition, the rise of temporary employment mainly
affects the lower-tail of the distribution and fattens the very bottom; female tem-
porary workers in sales and service or doing elementary occupations are the people
who suffered from the change the most.
In the second essay, joint with Peter Skott, we use an extension of a standard
efficiency wage model to explain the wage gap between temporary and permanent
workers. Temporary workers have a chance to become permanent; this possibility –
combined with the existence of an employment rent for permanent workers – gives
short-term workers an incentive to work hard. Thus, a high wage to permanent
workers serves a dual purpose: it affects the effort of both permanent and temporary
workers. Applying the model to the Korean experience, we discuss how institutional
changes have contributed to increasing earnings inequality.
My third essay explores wage effects of the use of temporary employment upon
permanent workers’ wage. I propose an idea; as temporary employment grows,
the fear of job loss is getting higher and the probability of getting a similar job
is getting lower for permanent workers. This lower job insecurity tends to lower
their bargaining power, and thus their pay level. Using a firm-level panel, I find
that wages for permanent workers decrease as the share of temporary workers in-
creases. The analysis also shows that wages for permanent workers in non-union
and small/medium-sized firms have greater negative impacts; this helps explain the
evolution of inequality in Korea.
Key words: temporary workers, inequality, decomposition, Korea, deregulation,
efficiency wages, job insecurity
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECT OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT TO
INEQUALITY
1.1 Introduction
This essay investigates the proximate causes of increasing Korean wage inequal-
ity during the 2000s but prior to the global recession. More specifically, I focus on
the rise in temporary employment as a source of increasing inequality. As tem-
porary employment became prevalent after a sharp rise by a nearly 10 percentage
points from 2001 to 2004, temporary employment has become an important research
topic in Korea. The definition and size of temporary employment, the existence
and the amount of the wage differential between permanent and temporary work-
ers, and the causes of the signicant rise in temporary work arrangements have been
discussed. However, wage effects of the use of temporary workers have not received
much attention.
The trends in wage inequality are depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1 describes the
trends of Gini coefficients, variance in log wages and log wage differentials between
90th and 10th percentile using the Wage Structure Survey (WSS) during 1985-2012.
Earnings inequality increased dramatically from the mid-1990s up to the late 2000s,
followed by a slightly falling trend.
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A number of studies suggest that the changes in returns to educational attain-
ment are the main cause of the evolution of earnings inequality in Korea. Fields
and Yoo (2000) and Yoo (1998) find that the decrease in the returns to school-
ing can explain the decrease in wage inequality until the mid-1990s using Fields’s
decomposition approach. Kang and Yun (2008) also employed a decomposition
method to study the question of what factors contributed to the changes in wage
inequality in Korea during the equalizing period, 1980-1994, and the disequalizing
period, 1994-2005 using the WSS. They find that changes in the wage structure
significantly contribute to the changes in wage inequality, and that the wage struc-
ture effect of human capital factors has played a major role for both periods. After
the mid-1990s, the skill-biased technical change (SBTC) hypothesis as a factor of
rising inequality was also studied in Korea (Jeong et al., 2004; Hur et al., 2005).
Here, I observe that in addition to the sharp increase in overall inequality, Figure
1 shows an increase in lower-tail (50-10) inequality that is only slightly smaller than
that in upper-tail (90-50). This is different from the trends in inequality in the
United States during the 1990s that upper-tail inequality kept rising, but lower-tail
inequality plateaued or decreased. Autor et al. (2008) explained the divergence in
inequalities using a version of the SBTC hypothesis that still emphasizes the role
of information technology that replaces routine tasks. However, the hypothesis is
hard to explain the sharp increase in lower-tail inequality. The changes in returns
to observed skills (Fields and Yoo, 2000; Yoo, 1998; Kang and Yun, 2008) and the
SBTC hypothesis (Hur, 2005; Jeong et al., 2004) may be appropriate in explaining
the movements of upper-tail in Korea, too. However, the rise in inequality in lower-
tail in Korea may need another explanation, as a reduction in minimum wage (Lee,
1999; Slonimczyk and Skott, 2012) or the power-biased technical change (Skott and
Guy, 2007) explain the evoluation of inequality in lower-tail in the United States.
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In this paper, I focus on a Korean type institutional change: the liberalization
of temporary contracts during the second half of 1990s in Korea. In 1998 two key
elements of deregulation were implemented – relaxion of employment protection on
permanent contracts and of the use of temporary contracts (KLI, 2008; Cho and
Lee, 2007). The institutional changes ended up with a sharp increase in temporary
workers. According to Figure 1, after the institutional changes and the economic
crisis in the late 1990s, the composition of the labor force has seen significant
change. The share of temporary workers among wage and salaried workers rose by
10.2 percentage points from 2001 to 2004; subsequently the share has fluctuated
around 34% with a slight decline after 2007. The trends in inequality and in the
share of temporary employment in this figure gives us the idea that the sharp
increase in temporary employment could affect wage inequality.
A recent Spanish study also provides a hint on this topic. As a result the reform
in 1984, Spain has one of the highest temporary employment rates in Europe: 23.7%
in 2012 as compared to 13.9% EU-wide (Ferreiro and Serrano, 2013)1. Cervini-Pla,
and Ramos (2012) examine the effect of the decline in temporary employment dur-
ing 1993-2000 on earnings variance and find that fixed-term workers face more
instability than permanent workers. This evidence implies the decrease in tempo-
rary contracts is responsible for the decreasing earnings inequality. Therefore, the
growth of temporary employment is worth considering to analyze the evolution of
earnings inequality in Korea.
In this chapter, the proximate sources of rising inequality are analyzed using
alternative ways of doing decomposition. First, the recently developed recentered
influence function (RIF) approach of Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux will be combined
1The temporary employment rates in Spain only include the fixed-term contracts, temporary
agency work and on-call work. Using the same definition, one of highest rates for each country
are 33.3% in Spain and 27.4% in Korea both in 2005.
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with the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition. Second, a reweighting
method introduced by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) (DFL) will be imple-
mented. A regression-based approach (RIF-regression) provides a starting point
and the DFL method complements the RIF-regressions: it overcomes the assump-
tion of the invariance of the conditional distribution of temporary status (Fortin,
Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011) and probes the robustness of the RIF-regression results.
The decompositions show large effects of changes in temporary employment:
these changes account for about 20-30% of the raw change in the Gini and variance
prior to the global recession. In addition to the numerical contribution, I also
provide movements of wage densities for all employees and by gender so that we
can understand how the changes in the composition of employment, especially
employment status, are associated with the evolution of inequality.
Section 2 describes the main changes in the Korean labor market with respect
to the composition of employment, wage distribution and the share of temporary
employment. The decomposition methods are explained in Section 3. Section 4
estimates the contribution of the growth of temporary employment to the increase
in wage inequality and discusses the importance of the developments in the compo-
sition of employment for understanding increasing inequality. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Data and descriptive statistics
1.2.1 Data
The analysis draws on the supplement to the Economically Active Population
Survey (EAPS supplement). The survey has been conducted every March and
August since 2000 (only August until 2006) by the Korean National Statistical
4
Office. The EAPS is a Korean labor force survey and Korean government calculates
the share of temporary workers using its supplements in March and August. Since
the data is the source of calculating official number of temporary employment,
a number of studies used this dataset to measure the wage differentials between
temporary and permanent workers.
In addition to the information of employment status, the EAPS contains most of
the information used in the wage equation for individuals. Real hourly earnings are
calculated as average monthly wages for three months divided by individual usual
work hours. The data also includes human characteristics (gender, age, educational
attainment, total labor market experience, and tenure) and job characteristics (in-
dustry and occupation). A shortcoming is that union membership and firm size,
which are both likely to affect pay level, have been surveyed only since 2004 and
2005 respectively, so I do not include them as covariates in the wage equations.
I choose the two periods, 2001-02, and 2004-05, because during 2002-04 the
share of temporary workers had a sharp rise and both periods are free from any
economic turbulence. One drawback of the EAPS supplement is that it covers
neither the mid-1990s when the trends of wage inequality reversed nor the late
1990s when the relevant institutions changed. Nevertheless, since the early 2000s
also exhibits obvious increases in wage inequality and in the ratio of temporary
employees, the research question can be answered with those periods.
The shortcomings of the dataset lead to some limitations. Because the EAPS
presents survey data for individuals, the answers for their wages and contract type
may have measurement errors. However, I found that the EAPS supplement are
quite reliable in terms of wage distributions by comparing inequality trends to
the WSS that were answered by employers. In addition, the interpretation of the
significant rise in temporary employment in the early 2000s needs caution, because
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the very early 2000s was the time before the definition of temporary work was
settled down and actively applied in the survey. However, it is widely accepted
that the late 1990s and the early 2000s are the periods that temporary contracts
became prevalent.
The samples with independent cross-sections for the pre and post period only
contain data on workers who were on the payroll of a firm in August for each
period. The sample only includes non-agricultural workers who are 25-65 years
old. Therefore, the final samples involve 84,835 observations – 39,924 for 2001-02
and 44,911 for 2004-05.
1.2.2 Changes in the composition of employment and wage inequality
Table 1 shows the main changes in the composition of employment between
the two periods in terms of contractual type, gender, age, educational attainment,
experience, and seniority. Above all, a sharp increase in the share of temporary
employment is observed. The ratio of temporary employees out of wage and salaried
workers increased by 9.2 percentage points. This was pictured in Figure 1. Despite
of the prevalence of temporary work, it is surprising that workers tended to stay
longer within a firm, hence years of seniority increased. The financial crisis in the
late 1990s can solve this puzzle; during the crisis, the unemployment rates increased
from below 3% to about 7% and the unemployed found their job in the early 2000s,
so workers’ tenure, on average, are lower in 2001-02. The proportion of female
workers increased by 1.8 percentage points. In addition, workers tend to be older
and more educated.
The second set of columns with the “Average hourly wage” display each group’s
average hourly wage in each period and growth rates in percentage. The hourly
wages were weighted by hours of work. Given the wage gap between permanent
6
Table 1: Summary statistics
Share (%) Average hourly wage (KRW)
Pre Post Pre Post ∆(%)
Employment status
Permanent 74.2 65.0 7,649 9,101 19.0
Temporary 25.8 35.0 5,676 6,418 13.1
Gender
Male 63.2 61.4 8,268 9,559 15.6
Female 36.8 38.6 5,248 6,037 15.0
Age (years)
25-35 39.6 36.4 6,755 7,655 13.3
35-45 33.0 32.9 7,939 9,143 15.2
45-55 18.5 21.5 7,685 8,827 14.9
55-65 8.8 9.2 5,630 6,323 12.3
Education
Middle 22.8 18.3 4,575 4,906 7.2
High 40.9 39.7 6,513 7,101 9.0
2 years college 12.4 13.4 7,451 8,184 9.8
>4 years college 23.8 28.5 11,135 12,437 11.7
Experience (years)
<10 26.7 25.2 6,847 7,690 12.3
10-20 33.5 32.6 7,894 9,138 15.8
20-30 24.4 25.9 7,529 8,766 16.4
>30 15.5 16.3 5,913 6,667 12.7
Seniority (years)
<1 29.2 28.2 5,002 5,461 9.2
1-3 22.6 22.5 6,113 6,738 10.2
3-7 23.5 22.9 7,012 7,926 13.0
>7 24.7 26.4 11,135 13,060 17.3
Industry
Manufacturing 26.7 25.4 7,064 8,311 17.7
Construction 10.2 9.8 6,690 7,212 7.8
Retail Trade and Accommodations 26.0 24.3 5,950 6,390 7.4
FIRE and Business Services 14.4 16.0 8,046 9,205 14.4
Social and Personal Services 22.0 23.8 8,659 10,055 16.1
Occupation
Managers and Professionals 23.0 24.2 10,905 12,290 12.7
Clerks 17.0 19.8 8,624 10,081 16.9
Sales and Service Workers 17.4 16.2 5,022 5,554 10.6
Craft, Operators and Assemblers 28.3 25.4 6,384 7,200 12.8
Elementary Occupations 13.6 14.0 4,240 4,521 6.6
Observations 39,924 44,911 7,215 8,265 14.6
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and temporary workers, the lower growth of the average hourly wage of temporary
workers than that of permanent workers make the wage distribution worse in 2004-
05.
Other compositions and wage growth show a similar trend: wages for high-wage
earners grow fast, while ones for low-wage earners grow slowly. In detail, growth
rates of wages for female, young, low-educated, less experienced, less tenured work-
ers, workers in construction or wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels,
and workers with elementary occupations were lower than those for male, aged,
high-educated, experienced, tenured workers, workers in manufacturing or FIRE,
and professionals or clerks. This trend simply indicates that low wage earners tend
to be suppressed to the very bottom of the wage distribution and the overall wage
distribution becomes more dispersed. Furthermore, the changes in the composition
illustrate that the proportion of the highly paid groups went up in the post period
in general. Using the brief summary statistics, we can expect that the changes
in wage structure contributed to the increasing inequality and the changes in the
composition – top or bottom earnings groups tended to grow – also did.
Focusing on the dramatic increase in temporary work arrangements, Table 2
illustrates a more detailed picture of the changes in the labor force composition in
terms of contractual type and the changes in wage differentials.
The first set of columns with “Share of temps” display the fraction of temporary
workers in each group. For example, 34.4% of female workers had a temporary
contract in the pre period and the share increased to 43.3% in the post period.
Like Table 1, the second set of columns show the average hourly wages and growth
rates by employment type. The increase in temporary contracts across subgroups
is not surprising, given the significant overall rise in temporary workers.
From the age groups, we can see that elder workers older than 55 are the most
8
Table 2: Share of temps and hourly wage by employment status
Share of Average hourly wage (KRW)
temps (%) Permanent Temporary
Pre Post Pre Post ∆(%) Pre Post ∆(%)
Gender
Male 20.8 29.8 8,735 10,452 19.7 6,441 7,441 15.5
Female 34.4 43.3 5,424 6,526 20.3 4,832 5,279 9.3
Age (years)
25-35 20.3 30.0 6,849 7,868 14.9 6,336 7,108 12.2
35-45 25.1 33.5 8,463 10,038 18.6 6,142 7,178 16.9
45-55 29.5 37.6 8,515 10,386 22.0 5,470 6,055 10.7
55-65 45.7 54.4 6,732 8,271 22.9 4,183 4,559 9.0
Education
Middle 40.4 53.3 4,771 5,352 12.2 4,234 4,460 5.3
High 25.6 36.0 6,816 7,703 13.0 5,519 5,917 7.2
2 years college 18.0 28.8 7,690 8,621 12.1 6,251 7,026 12.4
>4 years college 16.3 24.8 11,328 13,005 14.8 9,993 10,566 5.7
Experience (years)
<10 18.6 29.0 6,857 7,834 14.3 6,797 7,307 7.5
10-20 22.8 31.2 8,304 9,781 17.8 6,292 7,554 20.1
20-30 28.4 36.6 8,182 10,081 23.2 5,663 6,301 11.3
>30 40.9 49.4 6,852 8,353 21.9 4,408 4,803 9.0
Seniority (years)
<1 46.6 58.8 5,192 5,749 10.7 4,745 5,224 10.1
1-3 24.9 36.0 6,134 6,901 12.5 6,038 6,415 6.2
3-7 18.9 29.8 7,122 8,158 14.5 6,486 7,346 13.3
>7 8.7 13.2 11,288 13,381 18.5 9,456 10,932 15.6
Industry
Manufacturing 12.6 21.2 7,285 8,641 18.6 5,258 6,990 33.0
Construction 51.0 63.5 7,762 9,097 17.2 5,586 6,079 8.8
Retail & Acco. 25.7 34.1 6,137 6,775 10.4 5,305 5,526 4.2
FIRE & B Ser. 38.1 48.8 9,187 11,254 22.5 6,169 7,096 15.0
Social & P Ser. 22.7 30.2 9,239 11,160 20.8 6,180 6,988 13.1
Occupation
Managers & Pro. 16.6 25.7 11,078 12,787 15.4 9,894 10,690 8.0
Clerks 12.1 21.1 8,791 10,545 19.9 7,239 8,217 13.5
Sales & Service 36.3 44.8 5,015 5,673 13.1 5,038 5,375 6.7
Craft & Ope. 23.2 32.5 6,598 7,626 15.6 5,638 6,281 11.4
Elementary 50.6 63.7 4,573 5,116 11.9 3,853 4,133 7.3
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precarious group in terms of type of contract. The fact that growth rates of pay level
for temporary workers in this group are very low, 9.0%, indicates their temporary
status is likely to affect wage determination and push them into the bottom of the
distribution. This is true that these elder workers are the people who are in poverty
and tend to participate more in the labor market not with a decent job, but with
a temporary and least paid job.
Also, note that aged workers with permanent contracts have, on average, a
similar pay level with the group of 25-35 years old, but elders with temporary
contracts obtain the lowest level. The polarization of wage growth rates between
them (22.9% vs. 9.0%) made it worse. This tells us that the employment status
does not make wage gaps only at a time, but affects wage profiles for longer time.
This is associated with different seniority wages for different contract types. In
the categories of “Seniority”, even though the groups with shorter than 3 years of
tenure do not show large wage differentials, the gaps get large, as tenure increases.
The more serious problem is that temporary workers are likely to lose the even
lower seniority wages. Based on the samples, 53% of temporary workers can work
within a firm for less than 1 year and only 8% of them can obtain the seniority
wages by staying more than 7 years in a firm. Therefore, temporary workers tend
to and have to frequently move in-and-out of firms and even the pool of labor force,
hence they are likely to lose their potential seniority wages and face much flatter
wage profiles than permanent workers.
The notable increase in temporary employment had no exception for high-
educated workers and professionals. We can expect that low-educated people and
workers with elementary occupations are highly likely to be a temporary worker;
the statistics confirm this. But between the two periods the proportions of tem-
porary contracts for high-educated and professionals grew by almost 10 percentage
10
points. The fact that these highly-educated employees or professionals but with a
temporary contract had very low wage growth rates (5.7% and 8.0%, respectively)
indicates that within-group inequality among temporary workers would have de-
clined.
The cagories of “Occupation” add another picture. Occupations tend to make
a very clear earnings class which is least affected by employment status. Table
2 shows that regardless of their type of contract, sales and service workers and
workers with elementary occupations are likely to belong to the lowest earnings
classes. These groups that account for more than 30% of employees had only 6.7-
13.1% of wage growth. This tells a story on the very bottom of the distribution
for both permanent and temporary workers: their relative wages declined and the
bottoms were fattened by them in the post period.
Table 3: Mean and distribution of log hourly wage by employment status
(1) All (2) Perm (3) Temp
Pre Post ∆ Pre Post ∆ Pre Post ∆
p90 9.497 9.671 0.175 9.563 9.767 0.204 9.177 9.361 0.184
p75 9.090 9.266 0.175 9.167 9.361 0.194 8.822 8.978 0.156
p50 8.675 8.801 0.126 8.765 8.924 0.160 8.446 8.559 0.113
p25 8.290 8.363 0.073 8.359 8.472 0.113 8.084 8.196 0.113
p10 7.982 8.067 0.085 8.071 8.151 0.079 7.746 7.897 0.151
mean 8.701 8.823 0.122 8.778 8.936 0.158 8.453 8.595 0.143
s.d. 0.599 0.625 0.026 0.571 0.608 0.037 0.618 0.596 -0.022
90-10 1.515 1.605 0.090 1.492 1.616 0.124 1.431 1.464 0.033
90-50 0.822 0.871 0.049 0.799 0.842 0.044 0.731 0.802 0.071
50-10 0.693 0.734 0.041 0.693 0.774 0.081 0.700 0.662 -0.038
Varinace 0.359 0.391 0.032 0.326 0.369 0.043 0.382 0.356 -0.027
Gini 0.039 0.040 0.002 0.037 0.039 0.002 0.040 0.039 -0.001
Table 3 and Figure 2 confirm above stories. Table 3 summarizes hourly wage at
percentiles and the average wage at each period in the first panel, and five inequality
measures for all and within-group inequalities by employment status in the second
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panel. Figure 2 illustrates wage densities.
In the first panel of the table, the increase in wage at 90th percentile is much
greater that those at 50th and 10th (0.175 v. 0.126, 0.085 respectively); this in-
dicates earnings inequality increased. The flattened distribution in 2004-05 (solid
lines in the figure) supports the increase in overall wage inequality. We can also
confirm that the changes in inequality in upper-tail and lower-tail are quite similar.
In addition, we alse see that wage inequality within permanent workers increased
in 2004-05. The flattening wage density and the fattening upper-tail for permanent
workers in Figure 2(c) show the change.
The changes in earnings distribution among temporary workers are interesting;
the fact that the increase in wage at 10th percentile is greater than that at median
among temporary workers and the reduction in standard deviation and distribu-
tional statistics in the second panel indicates that their within-group inequality
declined. Differently from the expectation of that the wages at high percentiles
grew slowly, the wage growth at 90th was high. Among temporary workers, only a
small fraction of workers with more than 7 years of tenure seemed to have the ben-
efit of high wage growth according to Table 2. For other high-wage earners, as long
as they have a temporary status, the wage differentials seem greater in 2004-05.
Therefore, temporary workers’ overall wage did not grow as much as permanent
workers. The more left centered and more densed wage distribution for temporary
workers in 2004-05 (in Figure 2(b) and 2(d)) show the change.
In sum, in terms of temporary status the inequality within temporary work-
ers declined, however the rise in within-group wage inequality among permanent
workers who are still the majority of the labor force outweigh the reduction. The
seemingly greater average wage differentials implies greater between-group inequal-
ity by the type of contract.
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1.3 Methodology
Each method has two stages. In the first stage, changes in earnings distribu-
tion are divided into a composition effect reflecting how changes in the share of
temporary employment, human characteristics and job characteristics affect the
distribution) and a wage structure effect (reflecting how changes in returns to tem-
porary status, additional years of schooling and labor market experience affect the
distribution). In the second stage, composition effects are further divided into the
separate contribution of each covariate – temporary status, educational attainment,
experience, tenure, industry, occupation, and gender.
RIF-regressions recently proposed by Firpo et al. (2007) will be combined
with the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition. No reweighting and a
reweighting method as DFL will be performed. RIF-regression with OB decom-
position will give us a full picture of detailed decomposition; contributions of each
covariate.
The DFL method is hard to implement for detailed decomposition. However,
when the covariate is a dummy variable, it is possible to isolate the contribution
of the covariate. When the dummy covariate is not independent of the other co-
variates, DFL method is more appropriate to decompose the effect of the dummy
variable. Therefore, the DFL method complements to RIF-regressions.
Here, I focus on the composition effect of temporary status, since this chap-
ter aims to measure the contribution of the rise in temporary employment to the
increase in earnings inequality.
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1.3.1 Total composition effect
A RIF-regression is similar to a standard regression, except that the dependent
variable, Y , is replaced by the recentered influence function (RIF) of a distribu-
tional statistic of interest. In other words, an estimate of the influence function
corresponding to an observed wage y for a distributional statistic of interest, ντ in
τ -quantile, is found and then recentered. This RIF then becomes the dependent
variable in a regression of RIF on the covariates.
Central to this method, rather than estimating the effect of each covariate on
hourly earnings directly in wage equations, I estimate the effect of each covariate
on the distributional statistic of hourly earnings. Denote the resulting regression
coefficient estimates as γ̂ν0 and γ̂
ν
1 for the period 0 and 1 respectively.
Then using the estimated coefficients, we can write and perform the equivalent
of the OB decomposition for any unconditional quantile as
∆̂νO = X1 (γ̂
ν
1 − γ̂ν0 ) +
(
X1 −X0
)
γ̂ν0 = ∆̂
ν
S + ∆̂
ν
X . (1.1)
where X denote covariates in wage equations. The first term in eq. (1.1)
represents wage structure effects (∆̂νS) and the second term in eq. (1.1) represents
composition effects (∆̂νX).
To the no reweighting method, the composition effect can be written using the
sample weights provided in the survey data, wt for period t,
∆̂νX =
(
N∑
i=1
w1iX1i −
N∑
i=1
w0iX0i
)
γ̂ν0 . (1.2)
For a reweighting RIF-regression method, the total composition effect can be
computed by considering a counterfactual state of the base period 0, where the
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distribution of all the covariates (X) remained in period 1. The subscript C denotes
counterfactual.
Creation of the counterfactual state requires appropriate weights be placed on
observations in the period 0. The counterfactual weights can be found by multiply-
ing a reweighting function (Ψ) by the sample weights (wt). The reweighting factor
Ψ̂(X) for observations in period 0 is following:
Ψ̂(X) =
P̂ (D1 = 1|X)/P̂ (D1 = 1)
P̂ (D1 = 0|X)/P̂ (D1 = 0)
(1.3)
where P̂ (D1 = 1|X) is the predicted probability of belonging to period 1 and
P̂ (D1 = 0|X) is the predicted probability of belonging to period 0, and P̂ (D1 = 0)
and P̂ (D1 = 1) are the sample proportions in period 0 and 1 respectively. For the
conditional probability P̂ (D1 = 1|X), a logit model is used.
Then the composition effect of the reweighting method can be written2
∆̂νX =
(
N∑
i=1
wCiX0i −
N∑
i=1
w0iX0i
)
γ̂ν0 . (1.4)
That is, the weights wC = w0Ψ̂, instead of the sample weights w0, yield the
counterfactual distributional statistic that would have prevailed if the distribution
of X had remained as it was in period 1.
In the first stage, the way of measuring the total composition effect by DFL is
2The wage structure effects of the reweighting method can be written
∆̂νS = (γ̂
ν
1 − γ̂νC)
N∑
i=1
w1iX1i
The difference between the sum of composition and wage structure effects and[(
N∑
i=1
w1iX1i
)
γ̂ν1 −
(
N∑
i=1
w0iX0i
)
γ̂ν0
]
is the specification error. The reweighting error is used
for checking whether the linear model is well specified. I chose 2001-02 as base period, because
this error is much lower than the case when 2004-05 is base period.
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same in the RIF-regressions.
1.3.2 The contribution of changes in temporary employment
The second stage of the decomposition further divides the composition effects
into the contributions of each factor. Just as a OB decomposition provides a
procedure to decompose changes in the mean into the contributions of each factor
to composition and wage structure effects, the innovations in Firpo et al. (2007)
allow us to do the same for any distributional statistic.
The composition effect in eq. (1.1) can be rewritten in terms of the sum of the
contribution of each covariate (Xk) as
∆̂νX =
K∑
k=1
(
X1k −X0k
)
γ̂ν0k. (1.5)
This is an unconditional reweighting procedure based on the change in the
marginal, as opposed to the conditional distribution of covariates. Unless the co-
variates are independent, however, this will yield biased estimates (Fortin, Lemieux,
and Firpo, 2011). This problem can be solved using the conditional reweighting
procedure as DFL.
In the second stage, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) show how to compute
the composition effect corresponding to a binary covariate like union status. Using
the same method to the binary of temporary status, I can compute the contribution
of the increase in temporary employment to the composition effect by estimating
what would happened to the wage distribution in period 0 if the distribution of
employment status (T ), but none of the other covariates (X−T ), looked like it
did in the period 1. In other words, consider the counterfactual distribution that
would prevail if the conditional distribution of employment status was what it was
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in period 1.
Note that we consider the distribution of temporary status conditional on the
other attributes, FX(T |X−T ). Unless employment status is independent of other
covariates(T⊥X−T ), the marginal distribution of temporary status, FX(T ), will
depend on the distribution of X−T , FX(X−T ). An advantage of the DFL is that
the method can rule out the confounded effects induced by changes in the other
attributes (Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011).
The counterfactual can be estimated using an appropriate reweighting function.
Ψ̂T (T,X−T ) = T · P̂1(T = 1|X−T )
P̂0(T = 1|X−T )
+ (1− T ) · P̂1(T = 0|X−T )
P̂0(T = 0|X−T )
. (1.6)
where P̂1(T = 1|X−T ) the predicted probability of being a temporary employee
in period 1.
Again, the counterfactual distributional statistic and the counterfactual den-
sity using kernel density methods can be estimated placing new weights wC,T =
w0Ψ̂T (T,X−T ) on the observations of the base period 0. The most important
strength of this semiparametric approach is that it helps us to get the base and
counterfactual densities. Comparing two density functions, we can obtain more de-
tailed information on what parts of the earnings distribution have been influenced
most.
Note that, however, one limitation of the DFL detailed decomposition is that
the results depend on the order in which the covariates are sequestially introduced
(DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996). For instance, estimates of the effect of
unions may be overstated if union workers tend to be concentrated in industries that
would pay high wages even in the absence of unions. To overcome the limitation,
Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) suggests a way around the problem of path
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dependence.
The basic idea is that the coefficient on the last covariate (T ) to be introduced in
the regression is not biased since the other covariates (X−T ) are controlled for. So
after considering the changes in all the other covariates, then we add the factor of
our interest. The unbiased estimator can be obtained by computing a reweighting
factor ΨX−T (X−T ) based on all the covariates except the one considered for the
detailed decomposition (T ). The reweighting factor is
Ψ̂X−T (X−T )) =
Ψ̂(X)
Ψ̂T |X−T (X−T )
(1.7)
where
Ψ̂T |X−T (X−T ) =
P̂ (D1 = 1|X−T )/P̂ (D1 = 1)
P̂ (D1 = 0|X−T )/P̂ (D1 = 0)
. (1.8)
And then the difference in distributional statistics between the counterfactual
using the reweighting factor using all covariates (Ψ(X) in eq. (1.3)) and the coun-
terfactual using the ratio of reweighting factors Ψ(X)ΨX−T (X−T ) is the estimated
contribution of covariate of our interest, here the temporary status (T ), to the
composition effect.
In sum, after taking advantages and disadvantages of each method into account,
Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) suggest to first use a regression-based approach
like the RIF-regressions and the DFL reweighting procedure can then be used to
probe the RIF-regression results, and make sure they are robust to the functional-
form assumptions implicit in the RIF-regressions. By comparing the results from
RIF-regression and DFL, I confirm the effect of the change in employment status
to the total composition and check the robustness of the estimates.
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1.4 Decomposition results
1.4.1 Total composition effect
Table 4 shows how much of the raw difference in distributional statistics between
the two periods is explained by the changes in the composition of employment. Both
decomposition methods estimate the contributions for all employees and by gender.
The reasons why I add the decomposition results for male and female workers are
that many studies provide evidence that the wage determination process differs
according to gender. Also, in this study how the prevalence of temporary work
affect wage distribution is likely to differ by gender.
Table 4 shows that the majority of, and sometimes even more than 100% of the
raw difference in inequality are due to the movements of the composition. These
results are contrary to Kang and Yun (2008) that find changes in the wage structure
significantly contribute to the changes in wage inequality. The main difference with
respect to the relative contribution of composition effects and wage structure effects
may come from different data sources or different sample periods – the early 2000s
is the period that the Korean economy adjusts to the high unemployment during
the financial crisis and to the institutional changes in the late 1990s.
Also, I can find the reason in that the contributions of composition effects are
quite different in upper and lower-tail of the distribution, whereas Kang and Yun
(2008) did not examine wage distribution. The decomposition results in Table 4
exhibit greater contribution of composition effects in lower-tail (101% from RIF-
regression and 94.5% from the DFL method) than in upper-tail (about 60%). This
can give a hint that wage structure effects corresponding to skill components such as
schooling and labor market experience are more associated with upper-tail, whereas
composition effects may be more relevant to lower-tail.
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Table 4: Total composition effect (2004-05)
Dstat. 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
RIF-regression
All
2001-02 1.5116 0.8166 0.6951 0.3586 0.0385
2004-05 1.6102 0.8749 0.7354 0.3906 0.0401
Difference 0.0986 0.0583 0.0403 0.0320 0.0016
Composition 0.0761 0.0354 0.0407 0.0334 0.0017
(% of Diff.) (77.1) (60.7) (100.9) (104.4) (107.8)
Male
2001-02 1.3940 0.7522 0.6418 0.3058 0.0348
2004-05 1.5288 0.8156 0.7132 0.3519 0.0372
Difference 0.1348 0.0635 0.0713 0.0461 0.0024
Composition 0.0692 0.0272 0.0420 0.0261 0.0015
(% of Diff.) (51.3) (42.9) (58.9) (56.6) (61.5)
Female
2001-02 1.3216 0.8363 0.4852 0.3131 0.0362
2004-05 1.4356 0.9045 0.5311 0.3235 0.0368
Difference 0.1140 0.0681 0.0459 0.0103 0.0006
Composition 0.0883 0.0489 0.0394 0.0440 0.0026
(% of Diff.) (77.4) (71.8) (85.9) (425.8) (413.5)
DFL
All
2001-02 1.5149 0.8220 0.6929 0.3586 0.0385
2004-05 1.6045 0.8706 0.7340 0.3906 0.0401
Difference 0.0897 0.0486 0.0411 0.0320 0.0016
Composition 0.0666 0.0278 0.0388 0.0331 0.0016
(% of Diff.) (74.3) (57.3) (94.5) (103.4) (104.7)
Male
2001-02 1.3943 0.7544 0.6399 0.3058 0.0348
2004-05 1.5041 0.7836 0.7205 0.3519 0.0372
Difference 0.1098 0.0292 0.0806 0.0461 0.0024
Composition 0.0835 0.0287 0.0548 0.0271 0.0015
(% of Diff.) (76.0) (98.1) (68.0) (58.8) (62.0)
Female
2001-02 1.3189 0.8334 0.4855 0.3132 0.0362
2004-05 1.4351 0.9163 0.5188 0.3235 0.0368
Difference 0.1162 0.0829 0.0333 0.0103 0.0006
Composition 0.0674 0.0395 0.0279 0.0390 0.0023
(% of Diff.) (58.0) (47.6) (83.9) (377.3) (360.7)
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Table 15 report the decomposition results of the RIF-regressions. The wage
structure effects of “Education” and “Experience” show the contribution of the
wage structure effect of human capital factors. Both categories increased the in-
equality only in the upper-tail (90-50). These results are comparable to Kang and
Yun (2008) and the SBTC hypothesis.
The significant composition effect in the lower-tail suggests the importance in-
stitutional factors. The decline in real value of minimum wages may have been
important in the United States. In Korea, however, minimum wages are far below
the basic needs and many employers avoid their legal responsibility. Other institu-
tional factors can be considered. The Korean economy had a wave of globalization
in the second half of 1990s and partly as a response to new development labor
market flexibility increased a lot. The Korean labor market now uses temporary
contracts the second most frequently to Spain. Thus, the increased prevalence of
temporary contracts is worth considering as a factor of rising inequality.
The decomposition results for male workers show that the composition effect
accounts for 50-60% of the raw difference in wage inequality. When we recognize
that the wage structure for males more faithfully reflect the market situation, these
results are more reliable and comparable to Kang and Yun (2008). The results also
confirm that the composition effect is greater in the lower-tail.
In addition, Figure 3 shows the wage densities for both periods, a counterfactual
density (defined as unchanged composition of 2004-05), and the difference between
the counterfactual and the 2001-02 density. The difference states that a group of
people below and around the median wage would have moved away in the counter-
factual, whereas there would have been a dense group of workers in the top of the
distribution whose compensation is much farther from the median wage. That is,
if the distribution of covariates remained in 2004-05, the upper tail would be fat-
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tening, so the distribution would be worse than the actual distribution in 2001-02.
For male workers, the trend is more obvious. The second graph of male workers (b)
shows a very typical difference in wage density when inequality grows. The median
workers tend to spread to each poles of the distribution.
In addition, the graphs in the third row show the real wage growth rates and
counterfactual wage growth by the composition effect. The counterfactual wage
growth (the dashed line) is flatter than the real wage growth (the solid line), which
means the composition effects cannot fully explain the increasing inequality. How-
ever, the slope in lower-tail is very close to the real growth, which means the rise in
inequality in lower-tail can be explained the composition effects. This is more ob-
vious for males. For females, the steepness of the two lines of wage growth is pretty
similar, which means the composition effects are influential on overall inequality
for female workers (except the very top).
1.4.2 The contribution of changes in temporary employment
The composition effect corresponding to the employment status is shown with
“Temp” in Table 5 and counterfactual distributions are depicted in Figure 4.
The RIF-regression results in (1) of Table 5 with a reweighting approach show
that the effects account for 29.1% of changes in log variance and 26.7% of changes in
Gini coefficients; about a quarter of the change in wage inequality can be attributed
to the rise in temporary workers. This is a significant impact. When it comes to the
log wage differential between the 90th and 10th percentile, however, it decreased
to 8.2%. However, in lower-tail the contribution is much greater than in upper-tail
(23.7% vs -2.5%). This is quite consistent to my hypothesis that the changes in
distribution in lower-tail are more affected by the growth of temporary contracts
than in upper-tail. It is intuitive that the effects of the growth of temporary
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employment hit the low wage earners more than the high wage earners.
Since the detailed decomposition of RIF-regressions assume each factor is inde-
pendent of the other covariates, the estimators might be biased if they are corre-
lated. For example, the growth of the business service sector whose share of tempo-
rary workers is already 40% in 2001-02 might result in the rise in temporary work.
Although this change is induced by changes in industrial sectors, RIF-regression
estimates would include this to the effects of temporary status. The DFL decom-
position method can rule out the confounded effects (Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo,
2011) and provide unbiased estimators.
The effects from DFL decomposition results in (2) are a bit lower than those of
RIF-regressions. In Table 5, the effects are only 2.3% of the changes in log wage
differential between 10th and 90th percentile. However, for variance and Gini that
contain all the information on pay levels (not only at a few quantiles), the effects
are large. The effects account for 27.5% of the change in log variance and 24.4% of
changes in Gini coefficients.
In the perspective of the correlation between the covariate of our interest (T )
and the other covariates (X−T ), the DFL results in (2) might be more reliable and
unbiased than the RIF-regression results. However, as described in the section 1.3,
the DFL approach suffers from path dependence. The estimators that are free from
path dependenece are shown in (3) under the DFL panel.
The results of (3) also show that the effects account for 28.1% of changes in log
variance and 25.8% of changes in Gini coefficients. The estimators show that the
effects are in between the RIF-regression and the DFL results in (2). Contrary to
our worry of overestimation of the DFL method in (2), they seemed to have been
underestimated. The confounded factor might have run the reverse; for instance,
the labor force tends to more educated in 2004-05, thus the overall likelihood of
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Table 5: The composition effect of employment status (2004-05)
Dstat. 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
RIF-regression
All
2001-02 1.5116 0.8166 0.6951 0.3586 0.0385
2004-05 1.6102 0.8749 0.7354 0.3906 0.0401
Difference 0.0986 0.0583 0.0403 0.0320 0.0016
Temp (1) 0.0081 -0.0014 0.0095 0.0093 0.0004
(% of Diff.) (8.2) (-2.5) (23.7) (29.1) (26.7)
Male
2001-02 1.3940 0.7522 0.6418 0.3058 0.0348
2004-05 1.5288 0.8156 0.7132 0.3519 0.0372
Difference 0.1348 0.0635 0.0713 0.0461 0.0024
Temp 0.0106 0.0023 0.0083 0.0060 0.0003
(% of Diff.) (7.9) (3.6) (11.7) (13.0) (13.8)
Female
2001-02 1.3216 0.8363 0.4852 0.3131 0.0362
2004-05 1.4356 0.9045 0.5311 0.3235 0.0368
Difference 0.1140 0.0681 0.0459 0.0103 0.0006
Temp 0.0127 -0.0035 0.0162 0.0138 0.0008
(% of Diff.) (11.1) (-5.1) (35.2) (133.3) (126.0)
DFL
All
2001-02 1.5149 0.8220 0.6929 0.3586 0.0385
2004-05 1.6045 0.8706 0.7340 0.3906 0.0401
Difference 0.0897 0.0486 0.0411 0.0320 0.0016
Temp (2) 0.0021 0.0016 0.0005 0.0088 0.0004
(% of Diff.) (2.3) (3.3) (1.2) (27.5) (24.4)
Temp (3) 0.0101 0.0083 0.0018 0.0090 0.0004
(% of Diff.) (11.2) (17.1) (4.3) (28.1) (25.8)
Male
2001-02 1.3943 0.7544 0.6399 0.3058 0.0348
2004-05 1.5041 0.7836 0.7205 0.3519 0.0372
Difference 0.1098 0.0292 0.0806 0.0461 0.0024
Temp 0.0164 0.0064 0.0101 0.0051 0.0003
(% of Diff.) (15.0) (21.9) (12.5) (11.1) (11.2)
Female
2001-02 1.3189 0.8334 0.4855 0.3132 0.0362
2004-05 1.4351 0.9163 0.5188 0.3235 0.0368
Difference 0.1162 0.0829 0.0333 0.0103 0.0006
Temp 0.0366 -0.0047 0.0413 0.0166 0.0009
(% of Diff.) (31.5) (-5.7) (124.1) (160.6) (147.0)
24
being a temporary employee must have decreased. Nevertheless, the share of tem-
porary workers has increased in the post period. This indicates the effects might be
even larger after excluding the effects of the other factors’ changes in composition.
Therefore, the unbiased estimates in DFL (3) confirm that the effects of tem-
porary employment are influential in the increase in earning inequality in the early
2000s.
Figure 4 illustrates what would be the counterfactual distributions if the com-
position of employment status looked like in 2004-05. In the second figure in Figure
4(a), many low wage earners tend to spread to the very bottom and to the middle
and top, hence the fattening two tails would increased the overall wage inequality.
The results that the composition effect of the employment status explains more
about the distribution below median is more obvious for female workers. Based
on the RIF-regression results, 35.2% of the changes in inequality below median are
due to the growth of temporary work. Figure 4(c) show that the left bottom was
fattened a lot and the last figure of (c) shows that the real and the counterfactual
wage growth have very similar trends below the 40th. Female workers’ within-group
inequality rose in upper-tail which is depicted by the upward sloping wage growth
line, but the very flat and non-monotonic wage growth above the 40th indicates
that the rise in temporary work did not seem to give any wage growth for female-
temporary-middle and high wage earners. It is well-known that service workers in
hotels and restaurants and workers with elementary occupations obtain very low
wages. The sample also shows that female employees account for about 70% of the
sales and service and about half of elementary occupations, and Table 2 shows those
occupations are the top two categories that use temporary work arrangements.
These facts tell us female workers doing sales, service and elementary work suffer
from the prevalence of temporary employment because they are easily exposed to
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poor working condition and low earnings due to their temporary status.
The very flat upward sloping (dashed) line in the last figure of Figure 4(b)
and low contributions for male in Table 5 show that the effects of the composition
declined to about 10% for male workers, while they increased a lot for female
workers. This is consistent to the fact that the likelihood of being a temporary
employee is higher for female when they enter the market or re-enter it after the
maternity leave. Like Kang and Yun (2008), the wage structure effect seems greater
for male.
Figure 5 displays the RIF-regression coefficients of the temporary status in the
pre and the post period, and the counterfactual of the pre period. Because these are
coefficients of unconditional quantile regressions, they can be used to estimate the
impact of X on the corresponding unconditional quantile, while quantile regression
estimates cannot be used to assess the more general economic or policy impact of
a change of X on the corresponding quantile of the unconditional distribution of
Y (Firpo et al., 2007).
In 2001-02, temprary work tended to reduce the hourly wage below the 40th
quantile, but much smaller impact above the point, which is likely to match to gen-
eral thinking of that low paid or low skilled jobs tend to have high association with
temporary status. In 2004-05, after a significant increase in temporary workers, the
situation seems to have changed. The line is pretty flat, and even downward as the
quantile goes up. Ironically, this resulted in the effect of temporary employment
is estimated to attenuate earnings inequality because of the reduction in the con-
ditional dispersion of wages (the “within” effect). This impact is shown with the
large negative wage structure effect of the rise in temporary employment in Table
15.
The movements of wage structure remain unexplained. If the movements have
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any causal relation between the growth of temporary employment, the total effect
of the prevalence of temporary employment could have improved the inequality.
However, with the increase in the wage differentials between temporary and per-
manent employees, I find the changes in the composition significantly worsened
inequality (the “between” effect).
1.4.3 Robustness
We can check the robustness of the decomposition results employing a differ-
ent post period, 2006-07. The decomposition results using the same methods are
displayed in Table 6 and Table 16.
The distributional statistics show that earnings inequality worsended from 2004-
05 to 2006-07, although the speed is lower. The sharp increase in the early 2000s
and the slow growth of wage inequality afterwards in the decompostion tables match
to the trends estimated using the WSS.
The composition effects corresponding to the employment status are quite sim-
ilar through (1)-(3) in terms of variance and Gini. They account for 15.7-19.9%
of the change in variance and 16.1-21.1% of the change in Gini; the effects are
still significant, even though the effects are smaller than Table 5 by 7-9 percentage
points.
1.5 Conclusion
Wage inequality and the proportion of temporary workers in total employment
have increased dramatically in Korea after the mid-1990s. This chapter estimates
the contribution of the temporary employment to rising earnings inequality. The
wage penalties associated with temporary work are substantial and can account for
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Table 6: The composition effect of employment status (2006-07)
Dstat. 90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
RIF-regression
2001-02 1.5116 0.8166 0.6951 0.3586 0.0385
2006-07 1.6517 0.9111 0.7407 0.3982 0.0402
Difference 0.1401 0.0945 0.0456 0.0396 0.0017
Reweighting
Total composition 0.1015 0.0536 0.0479 0.0414 0.0021
(% of Diff.) (72.4) (56.7) (105.0) (104.6) (127.2)
Temp (1) 0.0068 -0.0012 0.0081 0.0079 0.0004
(% of Diff.) (4.9) (-1.3) (17.6) (19.9) (21.1)
DFL
2001-02 1.5149 0.8220 0.6929 0.3586 0.0385
2006-07 1.6219 0.8799 0.7419 0.3982 0.0402
Difference 0.1070 0.0579 0.0490 0.0396 0.0017
Total composition 0.0891 0.0416 0.0476 0.0418 0.0021
(% of Diff.) (83.3) (71.2) (97.0) (105.5) (125.7)
Temp (2) 0.0021 0.0016 0.0005 0.0070 0.0003
(% of Diff.) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (15.7) (16.1)
Temp (3) 0.0101 0.0070 0.0031 0.0076 0.0003
(% of Diff.) (9.4) (12.0) (6.3) (19.3) (20.5)
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a substantial part (20-30%) of the growth in overall wage inequality like the Gini
and variance in log wages. And these results appear to be robust to alternative
ways of doing the decomposition, including using the recently developed recentered
influence function approach of Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux.
The analysis also shows that the changes in the composition of employment
status primarily affect the lower-tail of the distribution. Second, female tempo-
rary workers below the median are the people who are affected the most by the
prevalence of temporary work and its negative influence on wages; these workers
are hired mainly in sales and services and elementary occupations.
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Figure 1: Trends in wage inequality and share of temps in South Korea
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Note: The five distributional measures are Gini coefficients and variance in log hourly
wages, and log wage differentials between 90th and 10th (d9010), between 90th and 50th
(d9050), and between 50th and 10th (d5010) percentile. The right axis shows the values
of the Gini and variance. The distributional statistics are computed using the WSS
during 1985-2012. For calculating the share of temporary workers, the EAPS supplement
2001-12 are used.
30
Figure 2: Changes in wage distribution by employment type
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(the dashed line) and temporary workers (the dotted line) in 2001-02 and 2004-05, re-
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Figure 3: Counterfactual: total composition effects
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Note: The upper figures show the densities in 2001-02 (the solid line) and in 2004-05 (the
dashed line) and the counterfactual density (the dotted line). The figures in the second
row show the difference between the counterfactual and the 2001-02 density. The graphs
in the third row show the real wage growth rates (the solid line) and counterfactual wage
growth (the dashed line) by the total composition effect.
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Figure 4: Counterfactual: composition effects of employment status
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
de
ns
ity
7 8 9 10 11
log hourly wage
(a) All
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
7 8 9 10 11
log hourly wage
(b) Male
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
7 8 9 10
log hourly wage
(c) Female
−
.
04
−
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
di
ffe
re
nc
e
7 8 9 10 11
log hourly wage
−
.
04
−
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
 
7 8 9 10 11
log hourly wage
−
.
04
−
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
 
7 8 9 10
log hourly wage
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
%
 g
ro
wt
h
0 20 40 60 80 100
quantile
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
0 20 40 60 80 100
quantile
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
0 20 40 60 80 100
quantile
Note: The upper figures show the densities in 2001-02 (the solid line) and in 2004-05 (the
dashed line) and the counterfactual density (the dotted line). The lower figures show the
difference between the counterfactual and the 2001-02 density. The last row shows the
real wage growth rates (the solid line) and counterfactual wage growth (the dashed line)
by the composition effect corresponding to the increase in temporary status.
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Figure 5: Coefficients of “Temp” of unconditional quantile regressions
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Note: The solid line show the coefficient of unconditional quantile regression in 2001-
02 and the dashed line if for 2004-05. The dotted line shows the counterfactual wage
structure when the composition of the pre period looked like in the post period.
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CHAPTER 2
LABOR MARKET REFORM AND WAGE INEQUALITY
2.1 Introduction
A large and growing literature discusses the causes of increasing Korean in-
equality. Off-shoring, greater exposure to the global market, and skill-biased tech-
nological change have figured prominently in this discussion.1 These factors may
have contributed to increasing inequality, but legal and institutional changes can
also influence both relative wages and relative employment. In this paper we focus
on two changes: labor market reforms have reduced the employment protection
for permanent workers and relaxed the constraints on the use of non-regular em-
ployment contracts. These reforms, we argue, may help account for the observed
patterns of employment and wages.
Non-regular contracts take different forms, including fixed-term contracts (the
employment relationship is terminated automatically after the fixed-term), part-
time work (defined as less than 36 hours of weekly work), indirect employment (dis-
patched work and temporary agency work), as well as independent contract work,
on-call work/daily work, and tele-work/home-based work. The different forms of
1Ahn et al. (2007) point to off-shoring to lower-income East Asian countries as a source of
downward pressure on the demand for low-skill workers; Hur et al. (2005) and Jeong et al. (2004)
suggest that skill-biased technical change increased the wage for high-skill workers.
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non-reglar employment share a common feature: all non-regular workers typically
hope to gain ‘permanent’ employment, that is, to get a standard, open-ended em-
ployment contract. Temporary workers make up the majority of the non-regular
workers, and we shall use the term ‘temporary’ as a short-hand for the different
non-regular contracts.
Temporary workers make up a sizeable part of the labor force in many coun-
tries and a substantial literature addresses different aspects of this phenomenon.
European debates have focused mainly on the employment effects of temporary
contracts (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002, and so on.). The employment effets have
been less of a concern in Korea; official unemployment rates have been consistently
low, averaging 3.4% over the period from 1990 to 2012 with peaks of 7% during
the East Asian crisis in 1998 and 3.7% in the recent recession. In contrast to these
modest fluctuations in unemployment, wage inequality shows a dramatic increase
from the mid-1990s (see Figure 1). The increase in inequality coincided with pro-
nounced movements in the share of temporary workers; the share rose by more than
10 percentage points from 2001 to 2004 followed by a decline of about 3.5 precen-
tage points between 2004 and 2010 (Table 7). The wage premium for permanent
workers was substantial throughout the period and increased slightly after 2007.
Table 7: The share of temporary workers and the relative wages
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
LT /L (%) 26.8 27.4 32.6 37.0 36.6 35.5 35.9 33.8 34.9 33.3
wT /wP (%) 73.9 76.3 70.2 73.4 70.9 71.1 72.1 68.9 63.2 64.7
Source: the EAPS supplement.
Note: L = LT + LP
While clearly not conclusive, these simple patterns suggest that changes in the
prevalence of temporary contracts could help explain the rise in equality; this hy-
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pothesis gains support from the results in chapter 1. Controlling for worker charac-
teristics as well as changes in sectoral composition, the decomposition shows that,
depending on the precise method of decomposition, the rising share of temporary
workers can account for 20-30 percent of the growth in inequality between 2001
and 2007.
Even if the rise in temporary employment can be explained as the result of
labor market reforms, the employment and wage patterns present several puzzles.
A 50 percent rise in the employment ratio LT/LP was accompanied by a relative
wage wT/wP that was virtually the same in 2001 and 2004. This pattern could be
explained by assuming that temporary and permanent workers are close substitutes
but differ in terms of productivity, with permanent workers being more productive.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that temporary workers do not have a lower
productivity (see below). More importantly, the explanation is at odds with the
findings that temporary workers tend to receive a lower pay after controlling for
worker and job characteristics (Ahn 2004, and so on.) Thus, the question arises,
why do permanent workers receive a large wage premium if the two groups are close
substitutes and equally productive? Korean firms may face constraints that pre-
vent them from using temporary contracts, but no legal or institutional constraints
compel firms to offer their permanent workers a large wage premium. In a sys-
tem with powerful labor unions, the employment constraints could give permanent
workers a strong bargaining position. Korean unions are not powerful, however;
they have at times been militant, but the union density in Korea is very low.
In this paper we show how a wage gap between temporary and permanent
workers can be explained using an efficiency wage model. Temporary workers have
a chance to become permanent, and this possibility – combined with the existence of
an employment rent for permanent workers – gives temporary workers an incentive
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to work hard. Thus, a high wage to permanent workers serves a dual purpose: it
affects the effort of both permanent and temporary workers. Taking into account
legal and institutional constraints on the use of temporary workers and on firms’
the ability to dismiss permanent workers, an efficiency model along these lines can
be used to shed light on some of the effects of the Korean reforms.
Institutional constraints can take a variety of forms. In Korea some job cate-
gories cannot be filled with temporary agency workers. Other constraints come in
the form of limits on the possibility to roll over temporary contracts. The ability of
firms to dismiss permanent workers is curtailed by restrictions, too; some of these
restrictions affect the average termination rate (but not the determination of who
gets dismissed); others restrict the ability of the firm to single out low performance
workers.2 The specific Korean reforms and their implications for the parameters
of the model will be discussed in section 3. The key element in our argument
is both simple and intuitive, however: temporary workers may be motvated by
the prospect of promotion to permanent status. This argument is supported by a
variety of studies.
Lautsch (2002) presents evidence for two Boston-based companies, Polaroid and
Sarco, for the period 1996-97. The study describes four management systems for
contingent work. Each of the four systems has distinct labor practices, including
wage rules and career ladders. The use of temporary workers in Polaroid Digital
Products exemplifies our argument. At Polaroid, temporary and permanent work-
ers worked side-by-side in the same occupations. Despite their temporary status,
and equal or lower pay, the temporary workers performed at least as well as per-
2Restrictions of this kind are analogous to the restrictions that follow from an inability to
monitor and determine the performance of individual workers. Thus, the effects of a relaxation
of firing constraints can be similar to those of ‘power-biased technical change’ (Skott and Guy
2007, 2013); the Korean reforms involve ‘power-biased institutional change’.
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manent workers in the same jobs. The prospect of a permanent position motivated
them to work hard: a survey showed that 75% of the temporary workers accepted a
temporary position hoping to gain promotion to permanent status if they performed
well. This hope was justified: the best-performing temporary workers (roughly the
top 20%) were in fact rewarded by getting permanent employment.
Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) show that Swiss employees with a fixed-term
contract do significantly more overtime work and are less absent than those with an
open-ended contract. Engellandt and Riphahn interpret this finding as signaling
behavior from temporary workers who want to get a permanent position. Booth
et al. (2002) reach similar conclusions using U.K. data. Booth et al. conclude that
high effort among temporary workers is positively correlated with the probability
of career advancement.
At a more anecdotal level, there is significant evidence that workers see low paid
pemporary positions as a possible route to a permanent job. An interview with
a Korean temporary worker – Miss Kim, 27 – in E-daily News, August 2, 2011,
provides an example. Miss Kim started to work in a public business as an intern
in 2009. According to the interview, she expected to transition to a permanent
position if she worked harder than existing permanent workers; because of this
expectation, she accepted a very low wage. The willingness of both students non-
students in many countries to accept unpaid internships can be explained along
similar lines, although in principle internships should include a strong educational
component for the benefit of the intern.
The model in section 2 presents a simple formalization of wage setting in a labor
market with temporary and permanent workers. Section 3 discusses the application
of the model to the Korean labor market reforms after the 1997 crisis. To be clear,
the model – like any stylized model – leaves out many features that may have
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influenced inequality. Thus, there is no claim that the model fully explans the
rise in Korean wage inequality. The aim is more modest: to highlight a particular
mechanism that may have played a part. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The model
Temporary and permanent workers are not always identical in terms of qual-
ifications, and they sometimes perform different tasks. Any such differences may
clearly help account for differences in pay. In many cases, however, permanent
and temporary workers receive different wages even though they seem to perform
the same tasks and have equivalent skills. The model focuses on these cases: we
assume that all workers are identical with respect to qualifications and that they
are perfect substitutes in production. Disregarding non-labor inputs, the output of
the representative firm is given by
Y = F (ePLP + eTLT ) (2.1)
where Li denotes the number of workers with i-type contract and ei is the work-
ers’ effort. The model is set in discrete time. Workers are hired at the beginning of
a period and cannot be fired until the end. We assume that workers cannot move
directly from unemployment to a permanent job; all permanent workers acheived
their status by being promoted from a temporary position.
Temporary workers Temporary workers work for one period; at the end of this
period they are either dismissed or promoted to the status of permanent worker.
They choose the level of effort to maximize the expected value of the stream of
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future utility:3
max
eT
VT = wT − v(eT ) + β[p(eT )Vp + (1− p(eT ))u] (2.2)
where wT is the wage rate for temporary workers, v(eT ) the disutility associ-
ated with the effort eT , and β the discount factor; u¯, VT and Vp denote the ex-
pected present value of future utility streams for an unemployed worker, a tempo-
rary worker and a permanent worker, respectively; p(eT ) is the probability that a
temporary worker gains permanent status at the end of the contact period. The
solution to the maximization problem (2.2) satisfies the first order condition
v′ = βp′[Vp − u] (2.3)
Consider the two functions p(eT ) and v(eT ). Given the permanent-worker wage
premium, the incentives for temporary workers are stronger, the higher is the sen-
sitivity of promotion to effort. The ability of firms to link promotion to effort is
constrained, however, by the monitoring technology which determines the sensitiv-
ity of observed performance to variations in actual performance (effort). It seems
reasonable to suppose that a firm’s ability to distinguish between the effort of two
workers will depend on the ratio of their effort.4 Using a simple specification with
this property, we assume a log linear relation (with a ceiling at 1 and a floor at
zero):
3Dismissed workers either become unemployed or get a temporary contract at another firm. In
equilibrium the value of these two states will be equal (see below). Thus, the expression in (2.2)
covers the possibility that dismissed temporary workers move to another temporary position.
4‘Effort’ may have no natural cardinal scale. Implicitly, however, the specification of the
production function (2.1) pins down a particular cardinal representation: effort is measured in
terms of its productivity.
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p(eT ) = min{max{0, p¯+ λ log eT
e¯T
+ a}, 1} (2.4)
where e¯T the average effort of the firm’s temporary workers. The value of λ
is taken to be determined by the available monitoring technology; the value of p¯,
determines the average rate of promotion. Turning to v(eT ), we assume that the
disutility of effort takes the following form
v(eT ) = e
γ
T , γ > 1 (2.5)
Given the functional forms in (2.4) and (2.5), the first order condition (2.3)
implies that
eT = [
βλ
γ
(VP − u)]
1
γ (2.6)
As indicated by equation (2.6), temporary workers’ optimal effort is independent
of the temporary wage but increasing as a function of VP , the value function for
permanent workers. These properties of equation (2.6) are quite intuitive (and do
not depend on the specific functional forms in (2.3)-(2.4)). Temporary workers
cannot be fired during the period and are either dismissed at the end of the period
or promoted to permanent status. Their wage rate in the temporary job therefore
has no incentive effects; it is the prospect of promotion to a permanent position
that provides the incentives for temporary workers to put in effort. Because the
temporary wage plays no role in the effort decision, employers will want to set it
as low as possible; that is, the participation constraint must be binding:
VT = u (2.7)
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The participation constraint determines the wage wT . By assumption unem-
ployed workers never move directly to a permanent job; the only way to get a
permanent job is through promotion from a temporary position.5 Using (2.2) and
(2.5)-(2.7), we get an expression for wT :
wT =β(
λ
γ
− p)[Vp − u] + (1− β)u¯ (2.8)
=β(
λ
γ
− p)Vp + [1− β(1− p+ λ
γ
)]u¯ (2.9)
wT is increasing in λ but decreasing in p and β. An increase in λ (in firms’
monitoring ability) generates a rise in effort; with a given promotion rate a com-
pensating increase in wT is needed to satisfy the participation constraint. Higher
promotion rates or an increase in the discount factor, conversely, raise the present
value of expected future utility flows, allowing a reduction in the current wage with-
out violation of the participation constraint. Changes in VP and u¯, finally, have
ambiguous effects. An increase in VP reduces the required value of wT for any given
effort. But effort is not given: the increase in VP provides an incentive for tem-
porary workers to raise effort, with negative effects on the utility flow wT − v(eT );
if this incentive is strong enough (the value of λ is sufficiently high), a rise in wT
5This assumption implies that
u¯ = wU + β(δu¯+ (1− δ)VT )
= wU + βu¯
where wU is the flow utility from being unemployed and where the second equality follows from
the determination of wT by the participation constraint, VT = u¯. Thus,
u¯ =
wU
1− β
The value of wU is taken as exogenous; it may reflect a range of factors, including income oppor-
tunities in informal subsistence sectors and the level of unemployment benefits.
43
may be needed to satisfy the participation constraint. Analogously, an increase in
u¯ tightens the participation constraint, given VP , and therefore raises wT for any
given effort; the induced reduction in effort may offset this effect if λ is high.
Permanent workers Turning to the determination of Vp, the expected present
value of future utility streams for a worker in a permanent job is given by
VP = wP − v(eP ) + β(α(eP )VP + (1− α(eP ))u¯) (2.10)
where wP , v(eP ) and α(eP ) denote the wage, the worker’s disutility of effort, and
the probability that the worker continues in the job in the following period. The
sensitivity of a permanent worker’s continuation probability to variations in her
effort will reflect a combination of institutional constraints on the dismissal of low-
performing workers and technical constraints on the ability of firms to monitor the
performance of individual workers. These constraints reduce – but do not eliminate,
we assume – the effect of effort on the individual worker’s risk of dismissal, that is,
α′(eP ) > 0.
Permanent workers choose the level of effort to maximize the value function
(2.10). In a steady state (with constant values of wp and u¯) the first order condition
implies that
v′s = [wP − v(eP )− (1− β)u]s′, (2.11)
where
s = 1/(1− βα) (2.12)
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s can be interpreted as the discounted expected duration of the permanent job.6
By assumption the continuation probability α is increasing in eP and it follows
that so is s. Analogously to the specification of temporary workers’ probability of
promotion, we assume that s depends on the ratio of the worker’s own effort to the
average effort e¯P . Using a log-linear formulation,
log s = s¯+ µ log
eP
e¯P
(2.13)
where e¯P is the average effort of permanent workers.
7 Equation (2.13) implies
that
s′
s
= µ
1
eP
(2.14)
The specification of v(eP ), finally, follows from the assumption that all workers
are identical; the disutility of effort in permanent jobs takes the same form as (2.4):
v(ep) = e
γ
P , γ > 1 (2.15)
Using (2.14) and (2.15), the first order condition (2.11) can be written
γeγP = [wP − eγP − (1− β)u)]µ (2.16)
Hence,
6The value function can be written, alternatively, as
VP =E[
T−1∑
0
(wP − v(eP ))βt + βTu]
=u+ [w − v − (1− β)u]s
where T is the time of job loss and s = 11−βα .
7The specification can be seen as a log-linear approximation to a more general functional form.
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eP = [
µ
γ + µ
(wP − (1− β)u)]
1
γ (2.17)
As one would expect, a permanent worker’s effort is increasing in permanent
workers’ wages (wP ) but decreasing in the value of unemployment (u).
Equations (2.10) and (2.17) can be used to derive the cost of job loss (VP − u¯):
VP − u¯ = γs
γ + µ
(wP − (1− β)u) (2.18)
Firms Firms minimize unit labor cost subject to workers’ choice of effort and
the participation constraints. Using (2.6), (2.8), (2.17) and (2.18) the minimization
problem can be written
min
wP ,wT ,LP ,LT ,p
wPLP + wTLT (2.19)
s.t. ePLP + eTLT = 1
eP = [
µ
γ + µ
(wP − (1− β)u)]
1
γ
eT = [
βλs
γ + µ
(wP − (1− β)u)]
1
γ
wT = βs
λ− pγ
γ + µ
[wP − (1− β)u] + (1− β)u¯
pLT = (1− α)LP (2.20)
wP ≥ (1− β)u¯ (2.21)
Equation (2.20) is a steady-state condition: the number of permanent workers
can only be constant if the flow into permanent status (pLT ) equals the flow out
of permanent employment ((1 − α)LP ). The inequality (2.21) is the participation
constraint for permanent workers: workers will only accept a permanent job if
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VP − u¯ ≥ 0; using (2.18) this condition can be written as in (2.21).
Equilibrium Consider an institutionally constrained equilibrium in which (i)
the ratio of temporary to permanent employees has an exogenous, binding upper
limit (LT/LP = M), (ii) the average separation rate for permanent employees
(and therefore the average value of s¯) is exogenous, and (iii) the sensitivity of the
firing rate for an individual permanent worker to changes in the worker’s effort
is exogenous. In addition to these institutional constraints, we assume that the
sensitivity of the promotion rate for temporary workers to variations in effort (λ)
is fully determined by the given monitoring technology.
As shown in Appendix B, these assumptions yield the following equilibrium
solution:
wP = [
γ + µ
γ − 1
1− α¯ + p¯
p¯(γ + µ) + (1− α¯)βs¯(λ− p¯γ) + 1](1− β)u¯ (2.22)
wT = [βs¯
λ− p¯γ
γ − 1
1− α¯ + p¯
p¯(γ + µ) + (1− α¯)βs¯(λ− p¯γ) + 1](1− β)u¯ (2.23)
where (1 − α¯) is the institutionally determined separation rate for permanent
workers and p¯ = (1 − α¯)/M, s¯ = 1/(1 − α¯β). Equations (2.22)-(2.23) can be used
to analyze the effects of labor market reforms that alter the constraints on the
use of temporary workers (the ratio M) and/or the constraints on the dismissal of
permanent workers (the elasticity µ or the average dismissal rate α¯).
2.3 Korean labor market reforms
In the mid-1990s Korean policy makers became increasingly influenced by the
‘Washington Consensus’. The dominant view suggested that in an era of increasing
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globalization Korea’s competitiveness suffered from problems of high costs and low
efficiency; these problems, it was argued, could be addressed by a deregulation
of the Korean labor market which would reduce labor costs and allow a quick
adjustment to economic conditions.
In 1998 two key elements of deregulation were implemented (KLI, 2008; Cho
and Lee, 2007). The deregulation of dismissal law had been discussed at the Reform
Committee of Korean Industrial Relations in 1996 and spurred by IMF demands,
the Tripartite Commission reached agreement on 26 February 1998. This legislation
introduced the concept of dismissal of workers for ”urgent managerial needs” (ILO,
2011) and relaxed the strict employment protection on regular contracts (Yoo and
Kang, 2012).
Employment flexibility was further enhanced in July 1998 by the decision to
allow temporary work agencies under the Dispatched Workers Act. Under the
new law, dispatching agencies are allowed to hire out workers to firms for up to two
years in 26 occupations that require special expertise and experience (OECD, 2000).
The new law retained flexibility in the use of fixed-term contracts: no maximum
duration of fixed-term contracts was specified and there were no restrictions on
contract renewal (Yoo and Kang, 2012).
These labor market reforms are reflected in OECD indicators of employment
protection. The indicator for strictness of regulation on temporary contracts - cal-
culated as a weighted sum of items relating to fixed-term contracts and temporary
work agency contracts - falls from 3.125 to 2.125; the indicator for dismissal of
employees on regular contracts falls from 3.036 to 2.369.
Wage and employment effects of the 1998 reforms The reforms, first, reduced
employment protection for permanent workers. This increased the sensitivity of a
worker’s risk of dismissal to changes in her effort (i.e. µ shifted up) and raised the
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average dismissal rate (α¯ and hence s¯ = 1/(1−βα¯) shifted down). The relaxation of
restrictions on the use of temporary agency workers, second, raised the upper limit
of the ratio of temporary to permanent employees (M increased ). The changes in
M and α¯ have opposite effects on the average promotion rate p¯; we assume – in
line with the evidence – that p¯ was left unchanged by the reform.8 Table 8 presents
comparative statics for changes in s¯ and µ.
Table 8: Comparative statics
eP eT wT wP
s¯ ↓ + − ± if λ− γp¯ ≶ 0 +
µ ↑ + − ± if λ− γp¯ ≶ 0 ± if λ− γp¯ ≷ 0
The reforms increase eP and reduce eT ; the share of temporary employment
also increases. The effects on the two wage rates and the relative wage cannot be
signed in general. The ambiguity is resolved if λ = γp¯; in this special case wT is
unchanged while wP increases. A positive value of λ − γp¯ reinforces the tendency
for wage inequality to increase; a negative value may offset the rise in inequality.
Numerical simulation can be used to evaluate the likely outcomes. Using plausi-
ble parameters, we find that the 1998 reforms raise inequality and the employment
ratio LT/(LT +LP ) significantly; the relative wage wT/wP is reduced slightly. The
details are in Appendix C. The simulations are in line with the data in Figure 1 as
well as with the results in chapter 1.
8It is convenient to use s¯ and p¯ as shift parameters instead of the two institutionally determined
values, the permissible termination rate (1−α¯) and the maximum ratio of temporary to permanent
employment M . The values of s¯ and p¯ are determined directly by (1−α¯) and M : s¯ = 1/(1−α¯β)
and p¯ = (1− α¯)/M.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by two observations. Temporary workers in Korea,
first, earn significantly less than comparable permanent workers. Labor market
reforms, second, have been associated with a substantial rise in the proportion of
temporary workers and a very modest increase in the wage gap. The theoretical
model in this paper can account for these observations and help explain the rise in
inequality.
The model is highly stylized and has obvious limitations. From an applied
perspective, perhaps the most obvious problem is the focus on a particular mech-
anism; the model shows why identical workers can get very different wages in
equilibrium. Not all workers are identical, however, and the assumption of iden-
tical workers excludes some of the mechanisms that may have contributed to the
rise in Korean earnings inequality (skill biased technical change, for instance). The
formal analysis, furthermore, introduces several restrictive assumptions, including
an exogenously given value of the value of unemployment (u¯) and a steady-state
assumption. An exogenous value of u¯ would be plausible in a dual economy with a
large subsistence sector and a perfectly elastic supply of labor to the modern sector.
This description, however, no longer fits the Korean economy. Alternatively, the
fixed u¯ could be justified as being part of the steady-state assumption: the wage
ratio is independent of u¯, and the analysis concerns the properties of steady states
with a given u¯. This immediately brings up another weakness; the Korean econ-
omy has experienced considerable turbulence in the last 20 years and a convincing
analysis of this period requires a relaxation of the steady-state assumption. This
and other extensions of the analysis are left for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT, JOB INSECURITY,
AND WAGES
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores effect of the use of temporary employment on permanent
workers’ wages and suggests a theoretical explanation. This topic is important for
several reasons. We need to understand how wages are determined in a two-tier
labor market in a certain set of institutions such as low union density and decen-
tralized collective bargaining like in Korea. A volume of literature provide several
theories of how the use of temporary employment affects wage determination (Ben-
tolila and Dolado, 1994; Blanchflower et al., 1990; Gu˝ell, 2000). The analysis of
Korean data can narrow down which explanation matches the real world in a set of
institutions similar with those of Korea. The analysis can give policy implications.
Employers shift the blame for the use of temporary workers to permanent workers’
high wages. In addition, permanent workers are blamed for taking advantage of
temporary workers’ low wages by using them as a buffer. The results of this chap-
ter test if these arguments are true and give policy suggestions on the overuse of
temporary work arrangements.
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This chapter, first, proposes a theoretical explanation of the wage effects of the
use of temporary employment. As a factor of workers’ bargaining power in the
standard bargaining theory, I focus on the perceived job insecurity. As workers
have the perception of higher probability of job loss and of lower possibility of
getting a similar job, their wage growth is likely to be lower (Campbell et al.,
2007). A number of studies also show that pay level (not only wage growth rate)
has negative relations with local unemployment rates that reflect the likelihood of
losing jobs (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005). The share of temporary workers will
be introduced as a measurement of the fear of job loss or perceived job insecurity.
Second, I provide empirical evidence using the biannual Workplace Panel Survey
(WPS) 2005-2011; the findings are that wage levels have negative associations with
the share of temporary workers in a firm. The empirical analysis for subgroups by
unionism and firm size supports the idea of the negative relation between the frac-
tion of temporary employees and pay level. Furthermore, the analysis for subgroups
explains the evolution of wage inequality during the 2000s in Korea.
The outline of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews existing
literature and section 3 introduces my hypothesis. Section 4 describes data, and
the empirical models and the estimation results are provided in section 5. This
section also discusses the wage inequality in Korea using the estimation results.
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
The literature provides several channels through that the use of temporary
employment affects permanent workers’ wages.
Permanent workers’ wages can rise, first, based on the insider-outsider distinc-
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tion. Insiders under permanent contracts subject to high firing costs see their
jobs are more secure, as outsiders under temporary contracts with no firing costs
grow. Thus, insofar as the existence of temporary jobs provides a buffer against the
negative effect of wage increases on their employment probability, the wages of per-
manent workers will be higher when the share of temporary jobs is higher (Bentolila
and Dolado, 1994). Second, the proportion of temporary workers may affect work-
ers’ bargaining power. Permanent workers can warn about being uncooperative
with temporary workers; the “harassment” effect improves the bargaining position
(Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). In addition, higher profits from taking advantage of
temporary workers can be shared with permanent workers, then permanent work-
ers’ wages will increase (Blanchflower et al., 1990).
On the other hand, permanent workers’ wage could decline. First, the preva-
lence of temporary employment may reduce workers bargaining position, since tem-
porary workers are unlikely to participate in strikes. This is the “discipline” effect
(Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). Second, the increase in job security for permanent
workers boosts their job satisfaction. Therefore, the incentive compatible wage can
be reduced (Gu˝ell, 2000).
The efficiency wage model in chapter 2 also predicts wage effects of the use of
temporary employment. Because a number of parameters (promotion rates, the
sensitivity of a worker’s risk of dismissal to changes in his effort and the dismissal
rate, and separation rate) influence wages, not just the share of temporary work-
ers, the results for wages are ambiguous. However, the theory can accommodate
any institutional changes and predict the movements of permanent and temporary
workers’ wages. For example, simulating the 1998 reforms in Korea and assuming
a simplicity (λ = γp¯), we could expect the wage increases for permanent workers1.
1The reduced employment protection raises the sensitivity of a worker’s risk of dismissal to
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A number of empirical studies from the Spanish experience support the idea
that permanent workers’ wage tend to increase as the share of temporary workers
increases. Jimeno and Toharia (1993) analyzed the Spanish industry panel for
1987-91 and 44 sectors and found that there is a positive correlation between the
share of temporary workers and the bargained wage. Bentolila and Dolado (1994)
analyzed a large sample of private Spanish manufacturing firms over 1985-1988
and found that each percentage point increase in temporary employment could
raise permanent employees’ wage up to one-third of one percentage.
A Korean empirical study provides the opposite result. The study of Hwang
and Jang (2012) is the seminal paper examining the wage effect of the increase in
temporary employment from the Korean experience. They analyzed the effect of
the share of temporary workers in each firm on permanent workers’ wages measured
by 5 scales using the WPS 2005-09. Their finding is that the share of temporary
employment negatively impacts permanent workers’ wages. Therefore, they reject
the argument that permanent workers enjoy high salary at the cost of temporary
workers.
The different results between from the Spanish experience and from the Ko-
rean experience could be rooted in different methods or samples for the analysis,
different institutional background such as employment protection legislations and
the coverage of collective bargaining. Using the empirical evidence, we can narrow
down a possible theory among a number of stories in existing literature and my
explanation.
changes in his effort and the average dismissal rate. These changes produce a rise in permanent
workers’ wage and their effort; the rise in the sensitivity make permanent workers’ effort more
sensitive to changes in the wage, thus giving firms an incentive to raise permanent workers’ wage
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3.3 A hypothesis
Contrary to the buffer effect of the use of temporary contracts on permanent
workers’ job security, the growth of temporary employment can threaten perma-
nent workers’ job security. The reason why permanent workers’ job security is
expected to increase by the use of temporary contracts is when employers want to
reduce their number of employees, they will terminate temporary contracts with
no cost, instead of firing permanent workers with firing costs. Different stories
are also possible: temporary employees earn much less wages, but do the same
or similar tasks as permanent workers. Employers have incentives to replace per-
manent workers with temporary workers; if the wage gap between temporary and
permanent workers outweighs the firing costs, then firms may have incentives to
hire temporary employees in the place of permanent workers and if institutional
constraints on the use of temporary employment are easied, employers also would
replace permanent with temporary workers. For other purposes of labor practice –
to weaken the union or increase labor market flexibility, temporary contracts can
be preferred to permanent contracts. By these scenarios, permanent workers can
feel higher threat of job loss from the use of temporary contracts. Kuroki (2012)
finds that the expansion of temporary employment contributes significantly tos a
rise in perceived job insecurity among permanent workers in Japan.
The fall in perceived job security can slow down wage growth. Campbell et al.
(2007) finds that high fears of unemployment have significant negative impacts on
wage growth for male workers. This is the hypothesis of “traumatized workers”. In
1995 the former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan stated, “that fear has
doubtless played a significant role in the slowdown in growth of labor compensation
as workers have in effect sought to preserve their jobs by accepting lesser increases
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in wages.”
Subjective job insecurity also can affect pay level (not only wage growth along
the Phillips curve). Along the line of the “Wage Curve”, the negative relation
between local or industry unemployment rates and pay level in Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2005) is suggestive. Local unemploy-
ment rates reflect joblessness, and affect job insecurity. Thus, as unemployment
rises, firms realize that their employees feel a higher threat of losing jobs, and pay
lower levels of wage (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005).
A similar reasoning may work under the anticipated effects of the use of tempo-
rary contracts; as the labor market use more temporary workers, permanent workers
will realize they can be replaced by temporary workers and it is more difficult to find
a similar job. This reasoning can also work for lower wages for temporary workers.
However, here I focus on permanent workers. According to Munoz de Bustillo and
De Pedraza (2010), subjective job insecurity depends on the subjective probability
of exogenous job destruction and also the prospects for new employment. That is,
the higher proportion of temporary jobs, the lower probability of getting a decent
permanent job. Thus, the use of temporary workers harms permanent worker’s job
insecurity more and hence their wages.
In the two-tier labor market with permanent and temporary contracts, Pearce
(1998) suggests the share of temporary contracts as a better measure of job in-
security since temporary employment inevitably means uncertainty about future
employment. Hu˝bler and Hu˝bler (2006) also report that correlation between the
share of temporary workers and job security is significantly negative. Therefore, as
a measure of job insecurity, the share of temporary workers could play the same
role in determining wage levels with unemployment rates and result in lowering
wages. In sum, as temporary employment grows, permanent workers feel a higher
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threat of job loss; this decline in subjective job security reduces workers’ bargaining
position and thus their wages. Therefore, it can be argued that pay level can have
a negative relation with the share of temporary employees.
This relation can vary across subgroups. First, the presence or absence of unions
may affect this relation. The decline in bargaining position can affect union’s and
also individual’s bargaining. This paper focuses on the subjective job insecurity
that is somewhat different from objective values like unemployment rates. The fear
of job loss may work more implicitly in bargaining between an employer and an
individual worker, while the unemployment rates more explicitly play an role in
bargaining between a union and a firm. Therefore, I expect larger negative effects
among workers in non-union firms. Second, firm size also can have an influence;
in that the cost of job loss is great for permanent workers in large firms due to
their high wages, the decline in job security could be greater for them. However,
in reality, large firms tend to have strong unions, thus permanent workers in large
firms are unlikely to be fired. Instead, large firms tend to employ more temporary
workers, especially outsourced workers. In this case, temporary workers become
rather a buffer and the use of temporary contracts is unlikely to harm permanent
workers’ employment. Thus, the workers in small and medium-sized firms are the
people who are expected to suffer from the higher fear of job loss.
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The estimation begins with wage eqautions. The equations estimate the wage
effects of changes in the ratio of temporary to permanent workers. They are esti-
mated using the biannual WPS 2005-2011. Therefore, the WPS include 4 waves
and 7,147 observations during 2005-2011 – 1,905 in 2005, 1,735 in 2007, 1,737 in
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2009 and 1,770 in 2011.
The basic estimation is performed by following wage equation:
logwijt = γφijt + βXijt + αij + µjt + ijt. (3.1)
The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings of permanent workers. For
the earnings of permanent workers, the survey asks the annual pre-tax starting
wages of male permanent workers who graduate college or high school. Hourly
earnings are calculated as weekly real wages divided by usual work hours which
are the sum of statutory and extra work hours2. I use permanent workers’ starting
wages as proxies of permanent workers’ wages.
The independent variable of interest is the share of temporary workers3 of the
firm i in sector j in year t (φijt).
A question can be posed: why the share of temporary workers in a worker’s
own firm affect the worker’s job insecurity in terms of the probability of losing a
worker’s job and of getting a good, new job in case of job termination. It may be
acceptable that unemployment expectations for permanent workers are influenced
by own firms’ labor practice, thus the share of temporary workers in a worker’s own
firm is likely to catch the fear of job loss. However, the worker’s chances of getting a
good, new job in case of job termination are hard to rely on the ratio in the worker’s
own firm. The shares of temporary workers in industry sectors or occupational
categories are more appropriate, because a worker will gauge the likelihood of
getting a permanent job within similar sectors or with a similar occupation using
2Since work hours were not surveyed in 2005, the hours in 2007 were imputed
3The share was computed by the sum of fixed-term contracts, part-time, and indirect contracts
divided by the total number of employees which is also the sum of the number of total employees
in the survey and the number of indirect contracts.
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the same skills. Technically, the share of temporary workers in each occupational
category is difficult to compute using the WPS. The economic conditions than the
labor practice seem more deterministic in the probability of getting a job in a sector.
Therefore, the share of temporary workers in a firm seems the best one in that the
variable catches the fear of job loss.
Table 9: Descriptive statistics and variables
Variables Mean (Standard Deviation)
2005 2007 2009 2011 Total
Hourly wage (college) 8.474 8.258 8.496 8.380 8.409
(thousands KRW) (2.313) (2.340) (2.087) (2.051) (2.176)
Hourly wage (high school) 7.217 7.220 7.101 7.086 7.147
(thousands KRW) (1.851) (1.997) (1.667) (1.604) (1.768)
Share of temps (1) 0.125 0.113 0.102 0.118 0.115
(0.209) (0.203) (0.198) (0.202) (0.203)
Share of temps (2) 0.240 0.226 0.203 0.214 0.222
(0.238) (0.244) (0.225) (0.252) (0.240)
Number of total employees 134 135 135 136 135
(462) (429) (423) (390) (425)
Sales per employee 2,943 2,557 3,563 3,349 3,124
(millions KRW) (14,744) (15,095) (19,755) (21,039) (18,157)
Productivity 3.208 3.160 3.128 3.110 3.150
(0.676) (0.628) (0.530) (0.608) (0.613)
Union 0.197 0.205 0.204 0.194 0.200
(0.398) (0.404) (0.403) (0.395) (0.400)
The other covariates (X) include firm’s characteristics such as firm size, sector,
financial situation and workers’ bargaining power. I use the log of sales per employee
and productivity as default controls for financial situation. Productivity is a 5-point
scaled item that ranges from 1 very “unproductive” to 5 “very productive”. I can
use profit per employee, operating profit, and debt as alternatives: I found that
operating profit and debt do not have relevance to wages, while net profit per
employee does. Therefore, I use net profit per employee as an alternative of the
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sales per employee. Another important control is permanent workers’ bargaining
power as insiders; the existence of union and the coverage of the union are used to
capture this. The existence of union is the default variable.
According to studies on inter-industry wage differentials, institutional factors
such as unions, rent sharing, monitoring difficulty, and recruitment difficulty (Fair-
ris and Erik, 2008) explain a part of the wage variations. Therefore, sector dummies
are expected to control for the differences in starting wages from variation in human
capital-required skill to occupations and also institutional differences like sectoral
bargaining and features of efficiency wages like mornitoring difficulty.
Descriptive statistics of these variables are summarized in Table 9. The sum-
mary statistics were weighted by the cross-sectional sample weight. Not surpris-
ingly, college graduates earn more than high school graduates. The table says that
high school graduates at the beginning obtain 80% of college graduates’ starting
wages. I provide two shares of temporary workers weighted by the cross-sectional
sample weight (1) and by the number of total employees (2). The first value means
a firm hire temporary employees about 10%, on average. However, when the share
is weighted by the number of employees, the fraction increases to 22.2%. It says
that large firms tend to use more temporary contracts. This is much closer to
the official share of temporary workers (about 33%) from the Korean labor force
survey. Both values show the same trend; the fraction tends to be lower during
2005-2009. For the analysis, the sample weights (1) (the cross-sectional sample
weights for the pooling regressions and the panel weights for the panel analysis)
are employed for the question of how a permanent worker’s wage is affected by the
share of temporary employees.
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3.5 Empirical formulation and estimation results
3.5.1 Wage effects
Table 10 displays the main results. All the specifications include a set of controls
– number of employees, sales per employee, productivity, the existence of union.
The first 3 specifications are repeated cross-sectional regressions that do not control
for firms’ unobserved heterogeneity. Model 1 is the baseline; in addition to the set
of controls, this specification allows year effects and 2-digits industry (76 sectors)
fixed effects. Year effects reflect economic conditions which are influential on wage
determination. Furthermore, inter-industry wage differentials are widely accepted;
profitability, levels of required skills (related to individual educational attainment)
and monitoring difficulty vary across industries and they affect pay level through
various theoretical paths such as the bargaining theory, human captial theory, and
efficiency wage model. Thus, these controls are included in the baseline. Industries,
however, can face different economic situation, hence sectors may have different
time effect. This is considered in model 3.
Model 2 includes a lagged dependent variable considering possibly autoregres-
sive wages. It is known that current pay level largely depend on their pay level in
the past; the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are often greater than 0.5,
which tells significant influence of the variable. In Table 18 and 19, the coefficients
are 0.4 and 0.35 that are a bit lower. However, the sectoral fixed effects are likely
to be correlated to the lagged value. Thus, this specification is still meaningful in
that it provides consistent estimates after considering the feature of autoregressive
wages.
In addition to sectoral heterogeneity, firms also have their own labor practice
in terms of wage determination. The unobserved characteristics are controlled
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Table 10: Effects of the share of temporary workers on wages
Cross-sectional Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base Lagged Time Fixed Trends Time
dep: log(hourly wage of college graduates)
Share of temps -0.108∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗
(p-value) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2,598 1,738 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598
R2 0.405 0.544 0.465 0.755 0.784 0.809
dep: log(hourly wage of high school graduates)
Share of temps -0.067∗ -0.063 -0.072∗ -0.029 -0.062∗ -0.072∗
(p-value) (0.020) (0.052) (0.019) (0.310) (0.035) (0.019)
Observations 2,389 1,588 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.312 0.445 0.393 0.682 0.716 0.748
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes No No
Sector time trends No No No No Yes No
Sector year effects No No Yes No No Yes
Unit fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
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in model 4-6. Model 5 and 6 include sector time trends and sector specific year
effects, respectively. Referring to Table 18 and 19, the effects of firm size, sales per
employee, and the existence of union seem to be contained in the unit fixed effects.
The effects of productivity and share of temporary workers are still statistically
significant after controlling for firms’ fixed effects.
The most preferred model is the one with sector specific time effects and unit
fixed effects – model 6. According to the hausman test, fixed effects model is
preferred. Furthermore, before and after the economic crisis in 2008, economic
shocks may have different effects to each sector, hence sector specific time effects
are appropriate.
The preferred model says college graduates’ (with permanent contracts) starting
wages decrease by 0.09% when the share of temporary workers rise by 1 percentage
point. The effects are very small, but still statistically significant. For high school
graduates, the effects are even smaller and they are statistically significant only
at the 5% significance level. Thus, we can conclude that pay level decrease as
the share of temporary workers in a firm increases, or at least, the possibility of a
positive relation is denied.
In this case, it is possible for the relation to run the other way; high labor costs
for permanent workers may induce higher share of temporary workers. However,
their association by the reverse causality is positive. Therefore, although the esti-
mates of Table 10 might be inaccurate, the direction is correct, and the negative
impacts could be even greater.
3.5.2 Explanation on wage inequality
Hourly wage of college graduates, hourly wage of high school graduates, on
average, and share of temporary employees are summarized in Table 11. During
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Table 11: Wages for permanent workers and share of temporary workers
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Note: N and Y are the non-union and union workplace, respectively. Wages and ra-
tios of temporary workers are reported by firm size and union. Standard deviation in
parentheses.
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Table 12: Regression table: union
Baseline Time trend Fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Union No Union No Union
dep: log(hourly wage of college graduates)
Share of temps -0.092∗∗ -0.052 -0.105∗∗ -0.086 -0.109∗∗ -0.137∗
(p-value) (0.004) (0.371) (0.002) (0.183) (0.002) (0.013)
Observations 1,682 1,261 1,682 1,261 1,682 1,261
R2 0.356 0.386 0.442 0.454 0.765 0.801
dep: log(hourly wage of high school graduates)
Share of temps -0.044 -0.082 -0.063 -0.106 -0.091∗ -0.123
(p-value) (0.159) (0.198) (0.069) (0.122) (0.019) (0.052)
Observations 1,575 1,162 1,575 1,162 1,575 1,162
R2 0.271 0.266 0.375 0.349 0.703 0.744
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
the 4 waves, the wage differentials show a similar situation; workers in non-union
firms tend to earn lower pay than workers in union firms. However, the wage gaps
between small and medium-sized firms, and large firms are much greater. Firm size
is a very important wage determinant in Korea. Small and medium-sized firms are
pretty vulnerable to economic conditions, hence their profitability or even survival
are very uncertain. More importantly, large firms are likely to take advantage of
small and medium-sized firms using their economic power. Thus, the pies of small
and medium-sized firms are small. In addition, workers in large firms tend to have
strong unions, hence high wages.
Table 12 displays the estimation results of three sets of model. The first model
controls for sector heterogeneity and year effects (like the baseline in Table 10) and
shows that the negative effects for non-union firms are larger than for union firms
(-0.09 vs. -0.05) and statistically significant at 1% significance level. The third
model with fixed effects shows somewhat inconsistent results with the first model;
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the effect is larger in union firms. Note that, however, once sector time trends
are controlled in model 2, the results are similar with the first model; the effect
is smaller and statistically insignificant in union firms, but significant negative
effects for non-union firms (-0.105). The model 2 is preferred, since there is a
statistically significant negative linear trend in permanent workers’ starting wages
only for union firms. This trend is explained by the general trend of weaker unions
from globalization. This is consistent to Hwang and Jang (2012); they found that
the coefficient of the interaction of the union dummy and the share of temporary
workers is close to zero or positive but statistically insignificant.
Table 13: Regression table: firm size
Baseline Fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
<100 <300 >300 <100 <300 >300
dep: log(hourly wage of college graduates)
Share of temps -0.131∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.084 -0.230∗∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.010
(p-value) (0.006) (0.002) (0.052) (0.002) (0.003) (0.824)
Observations 902 1,720 1,223 902 1,720 1,223
R2 0.316 0.331 0.389 0.816 0.800 0.862
dep: log(hourly wage of high school graduates)
Share of temps -0.082 -0.056 -0.082 -0.145∗ -0.093∗ -0.001
(p-value) (0.059) (0.090) (0.084) (0.043) (0.039) (0.990)
Observations 867 1,640 1,097 867 1,640 1,097
R2 0.284 0.251 0.322 0.787 0.751 0.827
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Another disaggregate estimation was performed by firm size. The baseline and
the fixed effects model with sector specific time effects show the similar results.
Small or medium-sized firms with less than 100 or 300 employees have much larger
negative impacts in both specifications. The results in Table 13 support my hy-
pothesis that higher job insecurity measured by the share of temporary workers
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tends to lower workers’ wage, especially that in small and medium-sized firms.
The movements of bargaining position by the use of temporary employment differ
by institutional settings; where unions are powerful or bargaining is centralized,
the more temporary employees, the more secure for the insiders with a permanent
contract; where bargaining happens between an individual worker and a firm, the
perceived job insecurity plays an important role. Thus, Table 12 and 13 support
my argument; the negative impacts are greater for permanent workers who have a
weak union like in small and medium-sized firms and who are in the decentralized
bargaining in non-union firms.
In addition, we can get an important clue to increasing wage inequality from
Table 12 and 13. Given the wage gaps between small and large firms, and between
union and non-union firms, the tables show that the growth of temporary workers
have much more severe negative impacts to workers’ wages in small and medium-
sized firms, and non-union firms. These results help explain how the wage effects
of the use temporary workers have worsen the distribution during the first half of
2000s in Korea.
The effects on the wage distribution have controversy, because Table 10 states
that the use of temporary workers have negative effects for both high school and
college graduates. However, note that firm size plays an important role in wage
determination; Table 11 shows that high school graduates in large firms earn more
than college graduates in small and medium-sized firms (except 2009) at the be-
ginning. In addition, by the Statistics Korea, a worker’s relative wage in small and
medium-sized firms to that of large firms declined from 77% in 1994 to 65% in
2007. These values tell us that the wage gaps between large and small/medium-
sized firms increase with tenure because workers in large firms have seniority wages
in the internal labor markets, but workers in small/medium-sized firms tend to
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have high separation rates and firms’ profitability is also very uncertain (and their
wages too). Furthermore, the inequality rose during the second half of 1990s and
the 2000s.
Furthermore, the tendency of increasing wage differentials is related to the
prevalence of non-regular contracts. Large firms tend to make subcontracts and
the small and medium-sized subcontractors pay less. Because the actual employer-
employee relationship holds between the large firm (not the subcontractor) and a
worker in the subcontractor, this type of contract and work arrangements are often
used to reduce large firms’ costs. The large firms’ management decision results in
increases in temporary employment and worsening inequality.
Table 14: Regression table: manufacturing
Manu. Union Firm size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All N Y <100 <300 >300
dep: log(hourly wage of college graduates)
Share of temps -0.186∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ -0.156∗ -0.371∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗ -0.147∗
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000) (0.002) (0.037)
Observations 1,496 867 629 500 908 588
R2 0.768 0.762 0.849 0.789 0.762 0.860
dep: log(hourly wage of high school graduates)
Share of temps -0.181∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.125 -0.298∗∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.220∗
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.175) (0.001) (0.010) (0.013)
Observations 1,468 859 609 507 910 558
R2 0.709 0.708 0.781 0.747 0.702 0.813
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
To compare the results with Spanish empirical work for manufacturing firms,
I estimated a unit fixed effect model with sector specific year effects for different
subgroups. The results in Table 14 are the same as the results from the total sample
even for subgroups. Therefore I confirm that the different results are likely from
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different institutional settings like the coverage of collective bargaining.
According to ECB (2008), Spain has a high level of collective agreement cov-
erage. Therefore, although a rise in temporary employment could raise Spanish
workers’ fear of unemployment, it can be attenuated by the collective bargaining;
the buffer effect is more plausible in Spain. In Korea, however, the opposite story
seems more plausible; the union density is very low (about 10% among total em-
ployees during the 2000s) and employment protection was weakened in 1998. Only
a part of core workers in large firms have strong unions and the coverage of col-
lective bargaining is pretty low (Although industry unions are well organized in
Korea, negociation or bargaining basically happens with the firm level.). And the
sharp rise in temporary contracts in the early 2000s ended up with replacement
of permanent work with temporary contracts. Therefore, from the Korean experi-
ence and in those institutional setting, it is more probable that the prevalence of
temporary workers reduce permanent workers’ perceived job security and wages.
A study also connects Spain’s prevailing wage bargaining to movements of
wages. In Spain, wage inequality has not increased since the 1980s when the tem-
porary employment significantly rose. According to Ferreiro and Serrano (2013),
one of elements that helped avoid a high wage inequality is the prevailing wage
bargaining model and unions’ stable bargaining power since the 1980s.
In sum, the growth in temporary work can have wage effects. In Spain, the
strong unions and the bargaining system could help avoid a high wage inequality.
In Korea, however, wage bargaining is rather decentralized and happens between
an individual worker and an employer, then a worker’s fear of job loss can result in
negative effects on their level of wage.
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3.6 Conclusions
This chapter empirically finds different results from the Spanish experience;
the negative association between permanent worker’s pay level and the share of
temporary workers. Using the estimation results, I conclude that: (i) higher job
insecurity for permanent workers by the growth of temporary workers is consistent
with the wage effects of the use of temporary workers on permanent worker’s wage.;
(ii) different results can be due to different labor market institutions. This remains a
possibility of comparative study with Spain and many countries that use temporary
contracts.
The results are also meaningful in explaining the increasing wage inequality in
Korea and in linking to findings in chapter 1. The estimation results for subgroups
show that workers in small and medium-sized firms or non-union firms suffer from
the prevalence of temporary workers the most. This is consistent to the findings
in chapter 1 – within-group inequality among permanent workers increased and
the very bottom of the distribution hurt by the rise in temporary employment the
most.
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Appendix A: RIF-regression decomposition results
Table 15: RIF-regressions decomposition results (2004-05)
90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
2001-02 1.5116 0.8166 0.6951 0.3586 0.0385
2004-05 1.6102 0.8749 0.7354 0.3906 0.0401
Difference 0.0986 0.0583 0.0403 0.0320 0.0016
Total composition 0.0761 0.0354 0.0407 0.0334 0.0017
Temp 0.0081 -0.0014 0.0095 0.0093 0.0004
Female 0.0007 0.0029 -0.0022 0.0007 0.0001
Education 0.0304 0.0168 0.0136 0.0107 0.0005
Experience 0.0158 0.0115 0.0043 0.0057 0.0003
Tenure 0.0101 0.0051 0.0050 0.0031 0.0002
Industry 0.0043 -0.0001 0.0044 0.0009 0.0001
Occupation 0.0067 0.0006 0.0061 0.0030 0.0001
Wage structure 0.0342 0.0192 0.0150 -0.0003 0.0000
Temp -0.0372 -0.0108 -0.0264 -0.0260 -0.0012
Female -0.0174 -0.0138 -0.0036 -0.0136 -0.0007
Education -0.0009 0.0074 -0.0082 0.0034 0.0002
Experience -0.0070 0.0233 -0.0303 -0.0006 -0.0003
Tenure 0.0163 -0.0247 0.0410 0.0194 0.0009
Industry -0.0181 0.0350 -0.0531 -0.0138 -0.0009
Occupation -0.0300 -0.0122 0.0422 0.0039 0.0003
Constant 0.0686 0.0151 0.0535 0.0270 0.0016
Error -0.0052 -0.0021 -0.0031 -0.0010 0.0000
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Table 16: RIF-regressions decomposition results (2006-07)
90-10 90-50 50-10 Variance Gini
2001-02 1.5116 0.8166 0.6951 0.3586 0.0385
2006-07 1.6517 0.9111 0.7407 0.3982 0.0402
Difference 0.1401 0.0945 0.0456 0.0396 0.0017
Total composition 0.1015 0.0536 0.0479 0.0414 0.0021
Temp 0.0068 -0.0012 0.0081 0.0079 0.0004
Female 0.0009 0.0039 -0.0030 0.0010 0.0001
Education 0.0392 0.0217 0.0175 0.0137 0.0007
Experience 0.0265 0.0188 0.0076 0.0096 0.0005
Tenure 0.0076 0.0042 0.0033 0.0024 0.0001
Industry 0.0058 0.0002 0.0055 0.0008 0.0001
Occupation 0.0147 0.0059 0.0087 0.0060 0.0003
Wage structure 0.0444 0.0384 0.0060 -0.0032 -0.0005
Temp -0.0252 0.0005 -0.0256 -0.0206 -0.0009
Female -0.0472 -0.0461 -0.0011 -0.0248 -0.0013
Education -0.0516 0.0193 -0.0708 -0.0013 -0.0002
Experience -0.0463 0.0010 -0.0473 0.0036 -0.0002
Tenure 0.0178 0.0062 0.0116 0.0254 0.0013
Industry -0.0513 0.0080 -0.0594 -0.0202 -0.0012
Occupation 0.0505 0.0020 0.0485 0.0173 0.0012
Constant 0.1977 0.0475 0.1502 0.0175 0.0008
Error -0.0008 0.0017 -0.0025 0.0008 0.0001
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Appendix B: Cost minimization
The representative firm’s minimization problem can be written
min
wP ,wT ,LP ,LT ,p
wPLP + wTLT (B1)
s.t. ePLP + eTLT = 1 (B2)
eP = [
µ
γ + µ
(wP − (1− β)u)]
1
γ (B3)
eT = [
βλs
γ + µ
(wP − (1− β)u)]
1
γ (B4)
wT = βs
λ− pγ
γ + µ
[wP − (1− β)u] + (1− β)u¯ (B5)
pLT = (1− α)LP (B6)
wP ≥ (1− β)u¯ (B7)
Substituting (B2)-(B6) in (B1), the problem can be re-written
min
wP
p¯wP + (1− α¯){βsλ−pγγ+µ [wP − (1− β)u] + (1− β)u¯}
p¯[ µ
γ+µ
(wP − (1− β)u)]
1
γ + (1− α¯)[ βλs
γ+µ
(wP − (1− β)u)]
1
γ
(B8)
s.t. wP ≥ (1− β)u¯ (B9)
This problem can be expressed more simply as
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min
x
C[Ax1−
1
γ +Bx−
1
γ ] (B10)
s.t. x ≥ 0 (B11)
where
A =p¯+ (1− α)βsλ− pγ
γ + µ
(B12)
B =(1− α¯ + p¯)(1− β)u¯ (B13)
C =[p¯(
µ
γ + µ
)1/γ + (1− α¯)( βλs
γ + µ
)1/γ]−1 (B14)
x =wP − (1− β)u¯ (B15)
Assuming the inequality condition (B11) is met, the first-order condition be-
comes
γ − 1
γ
Ax−
1
γ − 1
γ
Bx−
1
γ
−1 = 0 (B16)
Hence,
wP − (1− β)u¯ =x = 1
γ − 1
B
A
(B17)
=
γ + µ
γ − 1
1− α¯ + p¯
p¯(γ + µ) + (1− α)βs(λ− p¯γ)(1− β)u¯ (B18)
and, using (B5),
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wP = [
γ + µ
γ − 1
1− α¯ + p¯
p¯(γ + µ) + (1− α)βs(λ− p¯γ) + 1](1− β)u¯ (B19)
wT = [βs
λ− pγ
γ − 1
1− α¯ + p¯
p¯(γ + µ) + (1− α)βs(λ− p¯γ) + 1](1− β)u¯ (B20)
The model loses its efficiency-wage character if the participation constraint
(B11) is binding; in this (uninteresting) case, the solutions simplify to
wP = wT = (1− β)u¯ (B21)
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Appendix C: Wage effects of Korean reforms
The calendar length of the unit period is taken to be 2 years in the baseline
simulation; this unit period fits evidence for the average duration of temporary
workers’ attachment to the same firm. With this unit period, a standard value for
the discount factor is β = 0.9. Our choices of α¯ = 0.774 and p¯ = 0.4 are based on
evidence from the panel data in the EAPS supplement for 2003-07; the data show
an annual continuation rate for permanent workers of about 0.88 and an annual
promotion rate for temporary workers of about 0.226. The values of α¯ and β can be
used to calculate both the expected duration and the discounted expected duration
of a permanent job: the expected duration is given by 1/(1− α¯) = 4.43 periods or
8.86 years; the discounted expected duration is s¯ = 3.321. The implied steady-state
value of the share of temporary workers in total employment is 0.36.
The remaining parameters in Table 17 (γ, µ, λ, u¯) are hard to pin down empiri-
cally. The chosen value of λ (λ = 1.2) implies that an individual temporary worker
who raises effort (=productivity) by 10% increases her chances of promotion from
0.226 to 0.34; an individual permanent worker who raises effort (=productivity) by
10% reduces her per-period risk of separation from 0.226 to 0.1. These sensitivities
seem plausible but we have no real evidence and have not yet carried out a more
detailed sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our results to variations in
these assumptions. The values of γ and u¯ were chosen to get a positive relation be-
tween wT and u¯ (which requires 1−β(1− p¯+ λγ ) > 0) and to achieve an empirically
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plausible value of the relative wage.
In the baseline scenario the optimal effort levels for each type of contracts are
eP = 1.450 for permanent workers and eT = 1.764 for temporary workers. The
precise values of the effort levels have no significance, but the result fits qualitative
evidence which suggests that eT tends to be greater than eP . Another way to look
at the differences in effort comes from noting that for a temporary worker who
provides the optimal effort level for permanent employees (1.450), the probability
of promotion would be 19%, rather than 22%. The wage rates are calculated
using (2.22) and (2.23). The results – wT = 9.748 and wP = 17.375 – imply that
temporary workers obtain 56.1% of permanent workers’ wages.
Table 17: Numerical exercises
base 1998 reforms
β 0.903 0.903
α¯ 0.774 0.672
γ 3.000 3.000
µ 2.000 2.500
λ 1.200 1.200
u 100.0 100.0
p¯ 0.400 0.400
s¯ 3.321 2.544
eP 1.450 1.591
eT 1.764 1.644
wT 9.748 9.748
wP 17.375 18.618
wT /wP 0.561 0.524
LT /(LT + LP ) 0.361 0.450
Variance of log wage 0.077 0.104
The baseline simulation is in the first column of Table 17; the results of the 1998
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reforms are displayed in the second column. The 1998 scenario assumes a decrease
in annual continuation rate of permanent workers by 0.06 and an increase in µ by
0.5.4 These changes produce a rise in wP and eP ; the rise in µ makes permanent
workers’ effort more sensitive to changes in the wage, thus giving firms an incentive
to raise wP . Temporary workers’ effort goes down (because VP and the value of
promotion drop) but their wage is unchanged (because the two effects of VP on wT
offset each other in the baseline case with λ−γp¯ = 0). As a result, the distribution
of income worsens – temporary workers now earn 52.4% of the permanent wage
(down from 56.1%) – and the ratio of temporary employment increases to 45% (up
from 36.1%).
4The new continuation rate gives an expected average job duration of 5.1; the observed average
duration of permanent jobs in Korea was about 6.2 years in the very early 2000s.
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Appendix D: WPS estimation results
Table 18: Regression table (college graduates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base Lagged Time Fixed Trends Time
Share of temps -0.108∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(employee) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.008 0.002 0.013
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.520) (0.850) (0.307)
Log(sales) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.627) (0.563) (0.251)
Productivity 0.029∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.018∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011)
Union 0.079∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ -0.003 0.003 0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.897) (0.922) (0.689)
Lagged wages 0.411∗∗∗
(0.000)
Observations 2598 1738 2598 2598 2598 2598
R2 0.405 0.544 0.465 0.755 0.784 0.809
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 19: Regression table (high school graduates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base Lagged Interaction Fixed Trends Time
Share of temps -0.067∗ -0.063 -0.072∗ -0.029 -0.062∗ -0.072∗
(0.020) (0.052) (0.019) (0.310) (0.035) (0.019)
Log(employee) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.005 0.007 0.018
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.739) (0.621) (0.211)
Log(sales) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.011 0.008 0.014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.151) (0.287) (0.091)
Productivity 0.026∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.015∗ 0.020∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.018) (0.046) (0.014)
Union 0.082∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ -0.001 0.010 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.971) (0.750) (0.815)
Lagged wages 0.357∗∗∗
(0.000)
Observations 2389 1588 2389 2389 2389 2389
R2 0.312 0.445 0.393 0.682 0.716 0.748
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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